Circuit Splits

Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) authorizes individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials, and whether Congress has constitutional power under the Spending Clause to impose such personal liability.

Circuits are split on whether RLUIPA permits suits for money damages against prison officials in their individual capacities. Some circuits allow such suits while others hold that RLUIPA does not clearly authorize individual-capacity damages, raising questions about the scope of Congressional spending power to impose personal liability on non-recipients of federal funds.

Whether a district court may consider factors related to potential errors or unfairness in a defendant's conviction or sentence as part of the 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' analysis for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether compassionate release motions may be used to raise claims that overlap with habeas corpus challenges, such as alleged sentencing errors or constitutional violations in the underlying conviction. Some circuits permit consideration of such factors, while others hold that § 3582(c)(1)(A) cannot be used as a substitute for § 2255 habeas relief.

What legal standards govern claims of discrimination or unfair treatment in the operation of hospitality or business establishments under federal civil rights law?

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among circuits over the standards for discrimination claims against hospitality and business operators, including questions about liability and available remedies. The Second Circuit's approach was deemed sufficiently unsettled to warrant review.

Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempts state-law negligence claims against freight brokers who arrange transportation of property by motor carriers.

Circuits are split on whether the FAAAA's broad preemption clause, which prohibits states from enacting laws 'related to a price, route, or service of any... broker,' preempts common-law negligence claims against freight brokers for injuries arising from the carrier's operations. This split affects the liability exposure of freight brokers nationwide.

Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims based on allegedly inadequate product labeling when the EPA has not required the specific warning.

Circuits disagree on whether FIFRA's preemption provision bars state-law failure-to-warn claims against pesticide manufacturers when the claim is based on the absence of a warning that the EPA did not require. The split affects product liability litigation involving agricultural chemicals and consumer pesticide products.

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms, violates the Second Amendment as applied to marijuana users.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bruen, circuits have split on whether § 922(g)(3)'s prohibition on firearm possession by users of controlled substances — particularly marijuana — is constitutional. Some circuits have upheld the law under historical tradition analysis, while others have found it unconstitutional as applied to marijuana users.

Whether workers who distribute baked goods to retail stores qualify as 'transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce' under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, thereby exempting them from mandatory arbitration agreements.

Circuits disagree on the scope of the FAA's Section 1 transportation worker exemption, specifically whether workers who distribute goods to retail stores as part of a broader interstate distribution chain are 'transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.' The split affects the enforceability of arbitration agreements for a broad class of last-mile delivery workers.

Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act creates a private right of action allowing parties to a contract that violates the ICA to sue in federal court for rescission of that contract.

Circuits disagree on whether § 47(b) of the ICA provides an implied private right of action for rescission of contracts made in violation of the Act. This affects the ability of private parties to enforce the ICA's protections against abusive investment company practices through direct federal court actions.

Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as construed under the Gingles framework, can constitutionally compel race-based redistricting as a remedy for vote dilution, and whether compliance with Section 2 constitutes a compelling governmental interest justifying the use of race in drawing district lines.

This case raises the question of whether race-conscious redistricting mandated by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. Lower courts have applied the Gingles framework to require consideration of race, but the constitutionality of this framework as applied is increasingly contested.

Whether the rule of lenity trumps agency or Sentencing Commission deference (Auer/Kisor deference) when interpreting ambiguous criminal sentencing provisions.

Circuits disagree on whether lenity should prevail over deference to agency interpretations in criminal contexts. At least three circuits hold lenity trumps deference, while the Third Circuit held that agency deference trumps lenity. The issue has become more significant after Loper Bright overruled Chevron.

Whether Sentencing Guidelines commentary (Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2) can expand the definition of 'controlled substance offense' to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy when the guideline text does not mention them.

Circuits are divided on whether Application Note 1, which adds conspiracy and attempt to the definition of 'controlled substance offense' in § 4B1.2(b), is a valid interpretation entitled to deference under Stinson/Kisor, or whether it impermissibly expands the guideline text. This affects career-offender designations and substantially impacts sentencing ranges.

Whether a state drug conviction qualifies as a 'controlled substance offense' under the Sentencing Guidelines when the state schedule criminalizes substances not listed on the federal Controlled Substances Act schedules.

Circuits disagree on whether the career-offender guideline's definition of 'controlled substance offense' requires the substance to be federally controlled, or whether any state-law drug offense qualifies regardless of federal scheduling. This affects career-offender and armed-career-criminal sentencing enhancements.

Whether post-petition, pre-conversion increases in the equity of a debtor's assets belong to the bankruptcy estate or to the debtor upon good-faith conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether appreciation in property value between the date of a Chapter 13 filing and the date of conversion to Chapter 7 inures to the bankruptcy estate or belongs to the debtor. The Ninth Circuit held it belongs to the estate, while other circuits have reached the opposite conclusion. This matters significantly for debtors whose homes appreciate during the pendency of a Chapter 13 case.

Whether federal prisoners challenging conditions or terms of confinement (as opposed to fact or duration of confinement) must proceed via habeas corpus or may bring claims under other statutory vehicles such as Bivens or the APA.

A longstanding circuit split exists on whether habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for federal prisoners challenging conditions of confinement or decisions affecting the terms of their custody, or whether such challenges may also proceed as civil rights actions. This affects federal prisoners' ability to challenge BOP decisions regarding First Step Act time credits and prerelease custody.

Whether district courts may expressly impose revocation sentences to punish defendants for violating the conditions of supervised release, or whether revocation sentences must be justified solely by the need to facilitate the defendant's reentry into the community.

The Sixth Circuit allows district courts expressly to punish defendants for supervised release violations, while other circuits hold that revocation sentences must be tied to reentry goals, not punishment for the violation. This creates disparate outcomes for the hundreds of individuals facing revocation proceedings each year.

Whether the First Step Act's anti-stacking amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) constitutes an 'extraordinary and compelling reason' for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and whether the Sentencing Commission's policy statement (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)) can authorize such relief.

Circuits disagree on whether courts may grant compassionate release based on the nonretroactive changes to § 924(c) stacking, and whether the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating § 1B1.13(b)(6) to permit such relief. The Seventh Circuit holds that the Commission cannot override circuit precedent holding the anti-stacking amendment is not an extraordinary and compelling reason.

Whether the appeal deadline for a Hyde Amendment attorney's fees order is governed by the civil appeal timeline (60 days when the government is a party) or the criminal appeal timeline (14 days).

Circuits have split on whether a Hyde Amendment motion is a civil matter ancillary to a criminal case (triggering the longer civil appeal deadline) or part of the criminal case (triggering the shorter criminal deadline). The Seventh Circuit joined the majority view that the civil deadline applies.

Whether an order denying a motion to seal medical records in litigation is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine as an order involving a value of 'high order' that is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.

The D.C. Circuit held that orders denying motions to seal medical treatment and diagnosis information are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine because medical privacy is a value of 'high order.' This creates tension with other circuits' narrower applications of the collateral order doctrine to sealing disputes.

Whether the word 'and' in the First Step Act's safety-valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), is conjunctive (requiring all three criminal-history criteria to be met before disqualification) or disjunctive (any single criterion disqualifies).

The circuits are deeply split on whether 'and' in § 3553(f)(1) means 'and' or 'or,' which determines whether defendants must meet all three criminal-history disqualifiers or just one to be ineligible for safety-valve relief from mandatory minimums. This affects sentencing outcomes for drug defendants across the country.

Whether a multiemployer pension plan actuary may select actuarial assumptions for calculating withdrawal liability after the statutory measurement date (the end of the prior plan year), or whether all such assumptions must be fixed by that date.

Circuits disagree on when actuarial assumptions must be finalized for purposes of calculating employer withdrawal liability under ERISA. This affects billions of dollars in potential obligations for employers participating in multiemployer pension plans, as the timing of assumption selection directly controls how much withdrawing employers must pay.

Whether the term of supervised release is tolled (paused) when a supervisee absconds from supervision, thereby extending the period during which the person can be found to have violated the conditions of supervised release.

Circuits disagree on whether federal courts can apply a judicially-created 'fugitive tolling' doctrine to supervised release, effectively extending the supervision period beyond the term specified in the judgment when a person absconds. This affects revocation proceedings for thousands of individuals who abscond from supervised release each year.

Whether Section 2244(b)(1)'s bar on relitigating previously raised claims in habeas proceedings applies to federal prisoners filing motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

A longstanding 6-to-3 circuit split exists on whether federal prisoners face the additional gatekeeping requirement of § 2244(b)(1) — which categorically bars previously raised claims — when bringing successive § 2255 motions. If it applies, federal prisoners are barred from re-raising any previously presented claim; if not, they need only satisfy § 2255(h)'s requirements.

Whether a candidate for federal office has Article III standing to challenge a state law that allows the counting of mail-in ballots received after Election Day.

Circuits disagree on whether candidates have standing to bring pre-election challenges to voting rules. Some circuits grant candidates broad standing based on competitive injury, while others require more particularized injury. The issue has significant implications for pre-election challenges to mail-in voting procedures and ballot-counting deadlines nationwide.