Circuit Splits
Active disagreements among the federal circuit courts on questions of federal law. Where circuits conflict, the Supreme Court often steps in to resolve the split. Cases with ★ are already before the Court.
Whether a non-retroactive change in sentencing law (such as the First Step Act's anti-stacking amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) can constitute or contribute to 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Circuits disagree on whether district courts may consider non-retroactive changes in law as a factor supporting compassionate release. Some circuits prohibit any reliance on such changes, while others allow them as one factor among several. This split affects thousands of federal prisoners serving sentences that would be lower under current law.
Non-retroactive changes cannot support compassionate release
Holds that a non-retroactive change in sentencing law, whether alone or in combination with other factors, cannot contribute to a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Non-retroactive changes may be considered
Holds that non-retroactive changes in law may be considered as one factor among others when evaluating whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction.
Whether the rule of lenity trumps agency deference (Auer/Kisor deference) when interpreting ambiguous criminal sentencing provisions, such as the Sentencing Guidelines.
Circuits disagree on whether courts should defer to an agency's anti-defendant interpretation of an ambiguous criminal provision or instead apply the rule of lenity in favor of the defendant. This matters because it determines whether agencies can effectively expand criminal liability through interpretive guidance rather than formal lawmaking.
Lenity trumps deference
Holds that the rule of lenity takes precedence over agency deference when interpreting ambiguous criminal or sentencing provisions, preventing agencies from using delegated power to expand criminal liability.
Deference trumps lenity
Holds that agency deference (Auer/Kisor deference) to the Sentencing Commission's commentary can override the rule of lenity, allowing anti-defendant interpretations of ambiguous Guidelines provisions.
Whether Sentencing Guidelines commentary (Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2) that expands the definition of 'controlled substance offense' to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy is entitled to controlling deference under Stinson/Kisor.
Circuits are divided on whether Application Note 1, which adds conspiracy and other inchoate offenses to the career-offender guideline's definition of 'controlled substance offense,' is a valid and binding interpretation of the guideline text, which does not mention inchoate offenses. This affects whether defendants with prior conspiracy convictions qualify as career offenders with significantly higher sentencing ranges.
Commentary is entitled to deference
Holds that Application Note 1 is a reasonable interpretation of genuinely ambiguous guideline text and is entitled to controlling weight, so inchoate offenses qualify as career-offender predicates.
Commentary exceeds guideline text
Holds that the guideline text unambiguously excludes inchoate offenses, so Application Note 1 impermissibly expands the definition and is not entitled to deference.
Whether the word 'and' in the First Step Act's safety-valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), is conjunctive (requiring all three criminal-history criteria to disqualify a defendant) or disjunctive (any single criterion is disqualifying).
Circuits are deeply split on whether a defendant must meet all three criminal-history criteria listed in § 3553(f)(1) to be disqualified from safety-valve relief, or whether meeting any one criterion is disqualifying. This significantly affects mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses, as many defendants with modest criminal histories would qualify for relief under the conjunctive reading but not the disjunctive one.
'And' is conjunctive (all three required)
Holds that defendants are disqualified from safety-valve relief only if they meet all three criminal-history criteria, reading 'and' in its ordinary conjunctive sense.
'And' is disjunctive (any one disqualifies)
Holds that possessing any one of the three criminal-history criteria disqualifies a defendant from safety-valve relief, reading 'and' as distributive or disjunctive in context.
Whether a state drug conviction qualifies as a 'controlled substance offense' under the Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)) when the substance is controlled under state law but not under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
Circuits are split on whether the Guidelines' definition of 'controlled substance offense' is limited to substances on the federal schedule or also encompasses substances controlled only under state law. This affects career-offender and other sentencing enhancements for defendants with prior state drug convictions involving substances not federally scheduled.
State-only controlled substances qualify
Holds that the Guidelines broadly define 'controlled substance offense' to include offenses under state law, even if the particular substance is not controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
Only federally scheduled substances qualify
Holds that a prior state conviction qualifies as a 'controlled substance offense' only if the substance at issue is also controlled under the federal Controlled Substances Act.
Whether the deadline to appeal a Hyde Amendment order (denying attorney's fees in a criminal case) is governed by the civil appeal deadline (60 days) or the criminal appeal deadline (14 days).
Circuits disagree on whether a Hyde Amendment motion for attorney's fees is a civil matter ancillary to the criminal case (triggering the longer civil appeal deadline) or part of the criminal case itself (triggering the shorter criminal deadline). This determines whether defendants' appeals of fee denials are timely.
Civil deadline applies
Holds that a Hyde Amendment motion is a civil matter ancillary to the criminal case, so the civil appeal deadline applies. This is the majority view.
Criminal deadline applies
Holds that a Hyde Amendment motion is part of the criminal case, so the shorter criminal appeal deadline governs.
Whether post-petition, pre-conversion increases in the equity of a debtor's asset belong to the bankruptcy estate or to the debtor upon a good-faith conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A).
Circuits disagree on whether appreciation in property value that occurs between the filing of a Chapter 13 petition and its conversion to Chapter 7 inures to the bankruptcy estate or remains with the debtor. This split affects debtors who convert in good faith but whose property has appreciated, potentially leaving them with less than expected.
Appreciation belongs to the estate
Holds that the plain language of § 348(f)(1)(A), combined with the broad definition of 'property of the estate' in § 541(a), means post-petition appreciation inures to the bankruptcy estate upon conversion.
Appreciation belongs to the debtor
Holds that the Bankruptcy Code's structure and legislative history establish that post-petition, pre-conversion appreciation belongs to the debtor, not the estate, upon a good-faith conversion.
Whether district courts may expressly punish defendants for violations of supervised release, or whether revocation sentences must be limited to sanctioning the breach of trust and protecting the public.
Circuits disagree on whether supervised release revocation proceedings may include a punitive component or must be limited to the non-punitive purposes of vindicating the court's trust and protecting the public. The Sixth Circuit's precedent in United States v. Lewis allows express punishment for violations, placing it at the extreme of a circuit split.
Punishment is permissible
Holds that district courts may expressly punish defendants for violations of supervised release when revoking and resentencing.
Punishment is not a proper purpose
Holds that revocation sentences should focus on the breach of trust and public safety, not punishment for the underlying violation, consistent with the statutory text and Supreme Court precedent.
Last updated 2026-03-03 · Source: CourtListener · Analysis: Claude AI