Circuit Splits

Whether a multiemployer pension plan actuary may select actuarial assumptions for calculating withdrawal liability after the statutory measurement date (the end of the prior plan year), or whether all such assumptions must be fixed by that date.

Circuit courts disagree on whether ERISA requires actuarial assumptions used to calculate employer withdrawal liability to be locked in by the end of the prior plan year or whether actuaries may select assumptions after that date. This affects billions of dollars in potential obligations for thousands of employers participating in multiemployer pension plans.

What legal standards govern claims of discrimination in the operation of places of public accommodation under Title II of the Civil Rights Act?

Circuit courts have applied differing standards for establishing discrimination claims under Title II, particularly regarding the types of evidence sufficient to prove discriminatory treatment and the availability of compensatory damages. The Supreme Court granted cert to resolve the disagreement.

Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempts state-law negligence claims against freight brokers who arrange transportation of property by motor carriers.

Circuits are split on whether the FAAAA's broad preemption provision for brokers' 'services' extends to state-law negligence claims arising from a broker's selection of a motor carrier. Some circuits hold such claims are preempted, while others allow them to proceed under a general negligence theory.

Whether non-retroactive changes in sentencing law, such as the First Step Act's anti-stacking amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), can constitute or contribute to 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether district courts may consider non-retroactive changes in law — particularly the First Step Act's elimination of mandatory consecutive 'stacked' sentences for § 924(c) offenses — as a basis for compassionate release. Some circuits categorically prohibit it while others allow it as one factor among many.

Whether a district court may consider factors related to potential errors or unfairness in a defendant's conviction or sentence as part of the 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' analysis for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether claims that could also be raised in habeas proceedings under § 2255 — such as allegations of legal error in the original conviction or sentence — may be considered as extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. Some circuits allow it while others hold § 3582(c)(1)(A) cannot be used to circumvent § 2255.

Whether workers who distribute baked goods to retail stores qualify as 'transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce' under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, thereby exempting them from mandatory arbitration agreements.

Circuits disagree on the scope of the Section 1 exemption for transportation workers, particularly whether last-mile delivery workers who distribute goods to retail stores are 'engaged in . . . interstate commerce.' This affects the enforceability of arbitration agreements for a wide range of distribution workers.

Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims based on allegedly inadequate product labeling when the EPA has not required the specific warning.

The circuits disagree on whether FIFRA's preemption provision bars state-law failure-to-warn claims against pesticide manufacturers when the claims are based on labeling that the EPA approved. This affects product liability litigation involving agricultural chemicals and consumer pesticides nationwide.

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms, violates the Second Amendment as applied to marijuana users.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, the circuits have divided on whether § 922(g)(3)'s prohibition on firearm possession by marijuana users is consistent with the Second Amendment's text and historical tradition. This is increasingly significant as more states legalize marijuana.

Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) authorizes individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials.

Circuits are split on whether RLUIPA creates a cause of action for money damages against state prison officials in their individual capacities. Some circuits have held that RLUIPA, enacted under the Spending Clause, does not clearly authorize personal-liability damages against individuals who are not direct recipients of federal funds, while others have allowed such claims to proceed.

Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act creates a private right of action allowing parties to a contract that violates the ICA to sue in federal court for rescission of that contract.

Circuits disagree on whether § 47(b) of the ICA provides an implied private right of action for rescission of contracts made in violation of the Act. This affects the ability of private parties to enforce the ICA's protections against abusive investment company practices through direct federal court actions.

Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as construed under the Gingles framework, can constitutionally compel race-based redistricting as a remedy for vote dilution, and whether compliance with Section 2 constitutes a compelling governmental interest justifying the use of race in drawing district lines.

This case raises the question of whether race-conscious redistricting mandated by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. Lower courts have applied the Gingles framework to require consideration of race, but the constitutionality of this framework as applied is increasingly contested.

Whether the rule of lenity takes priority over agency or Sentencing Commission deference (Auer/Kisor deference) when interpreting ambiguous provisions in the Sentencing Guidelines that carry criminal consequences.

Circuits disagree on whether lenity trumps deference to agency interpretations in criminal sentencing contexts. At least three circuits hold lenity prevails, while the Third Circuit held deference trumps lenity. The issue is significant for criminal defendants whose sentences depend on how ambiguous Guidelines provisions are construed.

Whether the word 'and' in the First Step Act's safety-valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), is conjunctive (requiring all three criminal-history criteria to disqualify) or disjunctive (any one criterion disqualifies).

Circuits are deeply split on whether defendants are disqualified from safety-valve relief only if they meet all three criminal-history criteria listed in § 3553(f)(1), or whether possessing any one of the criteria is disqualifying. This split leads to defendants with identical criminal histories being sentenced differently depending on where they are prosecuted.

Whether the Sentencing Guidelines' commentary (Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2) may expand the definition of 'controlled substance offense' to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy when the guideline text does not mention them.

Circuits disagree on whether Application Note 1's inclusion of conspiracy and other inchoate offenses in the definition of 'controlled substance offense' is a valid interpretation entitled to deference under Stinson/Kisor, or whether it impermissibly expands the unambiguous guideline text. This affects career-offender designations for defendants with prior conspiracy convictions.

Whether a non-retroactive change in sentencing law (such as the First Step Act's anti-stacking amendment to § 924(c)) can be considered as a factor supporting 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Circuits are split on whether non-retroactive changes in law, alone or combined with other factors, may contribute to a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. Some circuits categorically bar consideration of such changes, while others permit courts to weigh them. This affects thousands of federal prisoners serving sentences that would be lower under current law.

Whether a state drug conviction qualifies as a 'controlled substance offense' under the Sentencing Guidelines when the state schedule of controlled substances is broader than the federal Controlled Substances Act.

Circuits disagree on whether the Guidelines' definition of 'controlled substance offense' in § 4B1.2(b) requires the underlying substance to be federally controlled, or whether any state-controlled substance qualifies. This split affects career-offender and other sentencing enhancements for defendants with prior state drug convictions.

Whether post-petition, pre-conversion increases in the equity of a debtor's property belong to the bankruptcy estate or to the debtor upon good-faith conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether appreciation in property value between the filing of a Chapter 13 petition and conversion to Chapter 7 inures to the bankruptcy estate or remains with the debtor. The Ninth Circuit held appreciation belongs to the estate, while other circuits have held it belongs to the debtor, creating a split that affects debtors' rights in conversion cases.

Whether federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is available to challenge conditions or circumstances of confinement (such as BOP credit and transfer decisions) as opposed to the fact or duration of confinement.

A longstanding circuit split exists on whether habeas corpus is the exclusive or even an available remedy for prisoners challenging conditions or execution of their sentence (such as BOP decisions on First Step Act time credits and prerelease custody), as opposed to challenges to the fact or duration of confinement. The split affects how prisoners can seek judicial review of BOP decisions.

Whether a district court may expressly consider punishment as a purpose when revoking supervised release and imposing a revocation sentence.

Circuits are split on whether punishment is a permissible purpose of supervised release revocation sentences. The Sixth Circuit allows district courts to punish defendants for violations of supervised release, placing it at the extreme end of a circuit split, while other circuits hold that revocation sentences should be primarily backward-looking at the breach of trust rather than purely punitive.

Whether the civil appeal deadline (rather than the criminal appeal deadline) applies to appeals from orders on Hyde Amendment motions for attorney's fees filed by criminal defendants.

Circuits have split on whether a Hyde Amendment motion for attorney's fees, though filed in a criminal case, is a civil matter for purposes of the appeal deadline. The Seventh Circuit joined the majority view that the civil deadline applies, but acknowledged the existence of a circuit split on this threshold procedural question.

Whether the term of supervised release is tolled (paused) when a supervisee absconds from supervision, thereby extending the period during which the person can be found to have violated the conditions of supervised release.

Circuits split on whether federal courts may apply a judicially-created 'fugitive tolling' doctrine to supervised release, effectively extending the court-ordered supervision period beyond the judgment's specified term when a person absconds. This affects revocation proceedings for thousands of individuals who abscond from supervised release each year.

Whether Section 2244(b)(1)'s bar on relitigating previously raised claims in habeas proceedings applies to federal prisoners filing successive motions under Section 2255.

Circuits are split 6-to-3 on whether the gatekeeping provision of § 2244(b)(1), which categorically bars claims previously presented in habeas, applies to federal prisoners proceeding under § 2255. If it applies, federal prisoners face a stricter barrier than the requirements of § 2255(h) alone would impose.

Whether a candidate for federal office has Article III standing to challenge a state law that allows the counting of mail-in ballots received after Election Day.

Circuits disagree on whether candidates have standing to bring pre-election challenges to voting procedures. The outcome determines whether election-administration challenges are litigated before or after elections, with significant implications for mail-in voting rules and ballot-counting deadlines nationwide.