Circuit Splits

Whether state laws categorically barring transgender women from women's sports teams violate the Equal Protection Clause, and what level of scrutiny applies to such classifications.

Circuits are beginning to divide on the constitutionality of state laws that categorically prohibit transgender athletes from competing on teams consistent with their gender identity. This split implicates the level of scrutiny applicable to sex-based and transgender classifications and whether as-applied challenges are viable under intermediate scrutiny.

Whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) clearly authorizes individual-capacity damages suits against state prison officials, and whether Congress has the constitutional power under the Spending Clause to impose such personal liability.

Circuits disagree on whether RLUIPA's text provides sufficiently clear notice to authorize damages claims against prison officials in their individual capacities, implicating Spending Clause limits on Congress's ability to impose personal liability on individuals who are not direct recipients of federal funds.

Whether a district court may consider factors related to potential errors or unfairness in a defendant's conviction or sentence as part of the 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' analysis for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether compassionate release motions may be used to raise claims that overlap with habeas corpus challenges, such as alleged sentencing errors or constitutional violations in the underlying conviction. Some circuits permit consideration of such factors, while others hold that § 3582(c)(1)(A) cannot be used as a substitute for § 2255 habeas relief.

Whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA) preempts state-law negligence claims against freight brokers who arrange transportation of property by motor carriers.

Circuits are split on whether the FAAAA's broad preemption clause, which prohibits states from enacting laws 'related to a price, route, or service of any... broker,' preempts common-law negligence claims against freight brokers for injuries arising from the carrier's operations. This split affects the liability exposure of freight brokers nationwide.

Whether the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims based on allegedly inadequate product labeling when the EPA has not required the specific warning.

Circuits disagree on whether FIFRA's preemption provision bars state-law failure-to-warn claims against pesticide manufacturers when the claim is based on the absence of a warning that the EPA did not require. The split affects product liability litigation involving agricultural chemicals and consumer pesticide products.

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits unlawful users of controlled substances from possessing firearms, violates the Second Amendment as applied to marijuana users.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bruen, circuits have split on whether § 922(g)(3)'s prohibition on firearm possession by users of controlled substances — particularly marijuana — is constitutional. Some circuits have upheld the law under historical tradition analysis, while others have found it unconstitutional as applied to marijuana users.

Whether workers who distribute baked goods to retail stores qualify as 'transportation workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce' under Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act, thereby exempting them from mandatory arbitration agreements.

Circuits disagree on the scope of the FAA's Section 1 transportation worker exemption, specifically whether workers who distribute goods to retail stores as part of a broader interstate distribution chain are 'transportation workers engaged in interstate commerce.' The split affects the enforceability of arbitration agreements for a broad class of last-mile delivery workers.

Whether Section 47(b) of the Investment Company Act creates a private right of action allowing parties to a contract that violates the ICA to sue in federal court for rescission of that contract.

Circuits disagree on whether § 47(b) of the ICA provides an implied private right of action for rescission of contracts made in violation of the Act. This affects the ability of private parties to enforce the ICA's protections against abusive investment company practices through direct federal court actions.

Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as construed under the Gingles framework, can constitutionally compel race-based redistricting as a remedy for vote dilution, and whether compliance with Section 2 constitutes a compelling governmental interest justifying the use of race in drawing district lines.

This case raises the question of whether race-conscious redistricting mandated by Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is constitutionally permissible under the Equal Protection Clause. Lower courts have applied the Gingles framework to require consideration of race, but the constitutionality of this framework as applied is increasingly contested.

Whether the rule of lenity takes precedence over agency deference (Auer/Kisor deference) when interpreting ambiguous provisions in the Sentencing Guidelines that affect criminal liability or sentencing enhancements.

Circuits disagree on whether courts should apply the rule of lenity or defer to the Sentencing Commission's interpretation when Guidelines provisions are ambiguous in criminal sentencing contexts. This matters because it determines whether ambiguity in sentencing rules is resolved in favor of the defendant or in favor of the government's preferred reading.

Whether the Sentencing Guidelines' Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, which expands the definition of 'controlled substance offense' to include inchoate offenses like conspiracy, is entitled to deference under Stinson/Kisor when the guideline text itself does not mention inchoate offenses.

Circuits disagree on whether Application Note 1's inclusion of conspiracy and attempt within 'controlled substance offense' is a valid, binding interpretation of the career-offender guideline or an impermissible expansion beyond the guideline's text. This affects whether defendants with prior conspiracy convictions qualify for significantly enhanced sentences under the career-offender provision.

Whether a state drug conviction qualifies as a 'controlled substance offense' under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) when the state schedule criminalizes substances not listed on the federal Controlled Substances Act schedules.

Circuits are split on whether the Guidelines' definition of 'controlled substance offense' requires the substance to be federally scheduled or whether any state-law drug offense qualifies. This affects career-offender and other sentencing enhancements for defendants with prior state drug convictions involving substances not on the federal schedules.

Whether a non-retroactive change in sentencing law (such as the First Step Act's amendments to mandatory minimums) can constitute or contribute to 'extraordinary and compelling reasons' for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether changes in law that Congress chose not to make retroactive can serve as a basis for compassionate release. Some circuits categorically bar reliance on non-retroactive changes, while others allow such changes to be considered. This affects thousands of federal prisoners serving sentences under now-amended mandatory minimum provisions.

Whether federal prisoners challenging BOP decisions about the conditions or terms of their confinement (as opposed to the fact or duration of confinement) must proceed via habeas corpus or may bring civil rights actions, and whether habeas corpus is available for such claims.

A longstanding circuit split exists on whether habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement or whether civil rights actions (Bivens or § 1983) are also available. This affects federal prisoners' ability to challenge BOP decisions on matters like First Step Act earned time credits and placement in prerelease custody.

Whether post-petition, pre-conversion increases in the equity of a debtor's asset belong to the bankruptcy estate or to the debtor upon good-faith conversion from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 under 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A).

Circuits disagree on whether appreciation in property value between the filing of a Chapter 13 petition and conversion to Chapter 7 inures to the bankruptcy estate or remains with the debtor. This affects whether Chapter 7 trustees can sell appreciated property to satisfy creditors when debtors convert in good faith.

Whether the time limit to appeal a denial of attorney's fees under the Hyde Amendment is governed by the civil appeal deadline (60 days) or the criminal appeal deadline (14 days).

Circuits split on whether a Hyde Amendment motion for attorney's fees is a civil matter ancillary to the criminal case (triggering the longer civil appeal deadline) or part of the criminal case itself (triggering the shorter criminal appeal deadline). This affects whether defendants can timely seek appellate review of denied fee requests.

Whether a district court may expressly punish a defendant for violations of supervised release when revoking supervision and imposing a sentence, or whether revocation sentences must be limited to facilitating reentry and public safety.

Circuits disagree on whether sentencing upon revocation of supervised release may include a punitive component or must be limited to the statutory purposes of deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation. The Sixth Circuit allows express punishment, while other circuits hold that supervised release revocation is fundamentally about reintegration, not retribution.

Whether an order denying a motion to seal documents containing private medical information is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.

Circuits have not uniformly addressed whether denials of motions to seal medical records qualify for immediate appellate review under the collateral order doctrine. The D.C. Circuit held such orders are appealable given the high value of medical privacy, but other circuits may differ on whether this category of claims is effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.

Whether the word 'and' in the First Step Act's safety-valve provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), is conjunctive (requiring all three criminal-history criteria to disqualify a defendant) or disjunctive (any single criterion disqualifies).

Circuits are deeply split on whether a defendant must meet all three criminal-history criteria listed in § 3553(f)(1) to be disqualified from safety-valve relief, or whether meeting any one criterion is disqualifying. This split affects mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses and creates disparate outcomes depending on where defendants are prosecuted.

Whether a multiemployer pension plan actuary may select actuarial assumptions for calculating withdrawal liability after the statutory measurement date (the end of the prior plan year), or whether all such assumptions must be fixed by that date.

Circuits disagreed on whether ERISA requires actuarial assumptions used to calculate an employer's withdrawal liability to be locked in by the end of the plan year or whether actuaries may adopt assumptions after that date. This affects billions of dollars in potential obligations for employers participating in multiemployer pension plans.

Whether the term of supervised release is tolled (paused) when a supervisee absconds from supervision, thereby extending the period during which the person can be found to have violated the conditions of supervised release.

Circuits split on whether federal courts can apply a judicially-created 'fugitive tolling' doctrine to supervised release, effectively extending the supervision period beyond what the judgment specifies when a person absconds. This affects how courts handle revocation proceedings for the thousands of individuals who abscond from supervised release each year.

Whether Section 2244(b)(1)'s bar on relitigating previously raised claims in habeas proceedings applies to federal prisoners filing motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

A 6-to-3 circuit split exists on whether federal prisoners face the additional gatekeeping requirement of § 2244(b)(1) — which categorically bars previously presented claims — when bringing successive § 2255 motions. If it applies, federal prisoners cannot relitigate any previously raised claim even if they meet § 2255(h)'s separate requirements.

Whether a candidate for federal office has Article III standing to challenge a state law that allows the counting of mail-in ballots received after Election Day.

Circuits disagreed on whether candidates have standing to bring pre-election challenges to election administration rules like ballot-receipt deadlines. The resolution affects whether election procedures can be challenged before votes are cast or only after election results are contested.

What legal standards govern claims of discrimination or unfair treatment in the operation of hospitality or business establishments?

The circuits have diverged on the standards applicable to discrimination claims arising in hospitality and service industry contexts, including questions about liability and remedies. SCOTUS granted cert to resolve the split, indicating the Second Circuit's approach was sufficiently contested.