Louisiana v. Callais
Whether Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as construed under the Gingles framework, can constitutionally compel race-based redistricting as a remedy for vote dilution, and whether compliance with Section 2 constitutes a compelling governmental interest justifying the use of race in drawing district lines.
Background & Facts
This case arose from Louisiana's 2022 congressional redistricting. In an earlier case called Robinson, a federal court found that Louisiana likely violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by packing and cracking Black voters, giving them only one majority-minority congressional district despite their population size and geography supporting two. After a five-day hearing with 21 witnesses, the court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Louisiana to draw a new map. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this finding twice. Louisiana then enacted SB8, which created a second majority-minority district.
Six white voters (the Callais plaintiffs) challenged SB8 as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander, arguing that race predominated in drawing the new district. A three-judge panel agreed. The case was then complicated by Louisiana switching sides — initially defending SB8 but now arguing that race-based redistricting under Section 2 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ordered reargument on the broader constitutional question of whether Section 2 compliance can justify intentional use of race in redistricting.
The new District 6 under SB8 combined Black populations from the Baton Rouge area with Black populations from the northwest part of the state. Louisiana admitted it drew SB8 solely because of the Robinson litigation and would never have passed it otherwise. The state also acknowledged that while race was a non-negotiable factor, partisan considerations also heavily influenced the map's final shape.
Why This Case Matters
This case could fundamentally reshape voting rights law in the United States. If the Court rules that Section 2 compliance is not a compelling interest justifying race-conscious redistricting, it could effectively end the creation of majority-minority districts as remedies for vote dilution — districts that have been the primary mechanism by which minority candidates have been elected across the South. Every Black congressional representative, state justice, and most state legislators in Louisiana were elected from Voting Rights Act opportunity districts.
The case also tests whether the Court will revisit or limit the Gingles framework it reaffirmed just two years ago in Allen v. Milligan, whether Congress's enforcement power under the Fifteenth Amendment supports effects-based voting discrimination claims, and whether race-based remedies require a temporal limit. The Solicitor General's proposed middle ground — requiring plaintiffs' illustrative maps to account for a state's political objectives — could create an entirely new doctrinal framework for Section 2 vote dilution claims, potentially making it far harder to prove violations in states where racial and partisan identity are highly correlated.
The Arguments
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act constitutionally authorizes race-conscious redistricting to remedy proven vote dilution. The Robinson court made robust factual findings of extreme racially polarized voting and vote dilution in Louisiana, and SB8 was a legitimate remedy that the Court's precedents, including Allen v. Milligan decided just two years ago, clearly support.
- Section 2 is self-limiting: as racially polarized voting and residential segregation decrease, plaintiffs cannot satisfy Gingles, and Section 2 cases have already decreased 50% in the past decade.
- SFFA is distinguishable because it involved the diversity rationale in university admissions, not a remedial statute derived from Congress's enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments to remedy specified discrimination.
- Section 2 is not itself a remedy but a mechanism for identifying when equal electoral opportunity is being denied; the remedy is separate and may or may not involve race consciousness.
- If SB8 is found unconstitutional, the proper course is to remand for adoption of alternative maps that address the undisturbed Section 2 violation while satisfying the Constitution.
Key Exchanges with Justices
Justice Kavanaugh
“What should be the time limit on the intentional deliberate use of race to sort people into different districts, if not deference to Congress?”
Nelson conceded there should be no time limit on Section 2 itself, distinguishing the statute from individual remedies, but offered Grutter's 25-year framework as guidance if the Court insists on one.
Justice Gorsuch
“Is it acceptable for a federal court to order a remedial map that intentionally discriminates on the basis of race?”
Nelson carefully avoided endorsing 'discrimination' language but acknowledged that limited, narrowly tailored use of race may sometimes be necessary, with states having broader leeway than courts.
Justice Barrett
“How do we judge the compelling interest in avoiding a Section 2 violation when the underlying finding was only a preliminary injunction and the State disagreed with it?”
Nelson argued the finding remains a compelling interest because it was affirmed by two Fifth Circuit panels and the State ultimately conceded compliance.
Race-based redistricting is fundamentally contrary to the Constitution because it requires diminishing one racial group's voting strength and augmenting another's, embedding racial stereotypes. Louisiana switched its position to argue that Section 2, insofar as it requires race-based redistricting, is unconstitutional and has no logical end point.
- Louisiana drew SB8 solely because the Robinson litigation forced it to; the state fought against creating a second majority-minority district and did so only under threat of court-imposed maps.
- The Robinson findings relied on historical discrimination from the 1930s-1960s and racially polarized voting statistics that this Court in Northwest Austin said are not evidence of intentional discrimination.
- The Gingles framework produces results built on impermissible racial stereotypes about how members of a race think and vote, with no logical end point for race-based redistricting.
- The Court has left open for decades whether compliance with Section 2 is a compelling interest; it should finally answer that question in the negative.
Key Exchanges with Justices
Justice Kagan
“The race-based redistricting you're objecting to is designed to remedy a specific, proved violation of law — racial discrimination by the State. How could that fall subject to a categorical rule against it?”
Aguiñaga resisted the premise that Robinson established specific discrimination, arguing the Gingles totality-of-circumstances analysis does not identify a clear violation.
Justice Thomas
“Why did the State of Louisiana switch sides since our last argument?”
Aguiñaga explained the state always believed race-based redistricting was unconstitutional and that the reargument question teed up this issue directly, requiring candor.
Justice Jackson
“Where in Section 2 does it mandate another minority district? Why isn't identifying the equal opportunity problem a compelling state interest?”
Aguiñaga insisted that the practical operation of Section 2 always leads to majority-minority districts and that without intentional discrimination, there is no compelling interest for race-based remedies.
Section 2 effects findings alone can no longer justify racially gerrymandering citizens into single-member districts based on stereotypes about how they think and vote. If race-based remedies were ever acceptable, they cannot continue indefinitely, and any such remedy must be in response to intentional discrimination.
- The Gingles showing as currently applied only demonstrates correlation between race and party, not actual racially polarized voting separated from partisan voting.
- The remedy of creating majority-minority districts inherently involves racial stereotyping — making assumptions about voters' politics and preferences based on their race.
- A race-based remedy requires a compelling interest rooted in intentional discrimination, not merely effects-based findings.
- The injury in Shaw racial gerrymandering cases is always stereotyping, which occurs whenever race predominates in sorting voters into districts.
Key Exchanges with Justices
Justice Kagan
“What does stereotyping have to do with this when Section 2 requirements are just about where people live and how whites vote — not assumptions about people?”
Greim struggled to connect stereotyping to the liability side, ultimately locating it in the remedy rather than the Section 2 finding itself.
Justice Jackson
“Why do we have to change Section 2? If the problem is the remedy, why not just apply Shaw strict scrutiny to the particular map?”
Greim acknowledged Section 2 itself might not need changing but insisted on breaking the link between effects-based findings and race-based remedies.
Justice Sotomayor
“You're saying race can be used for partisan goals but can't be used to remedy discrimination — that's what you want us to hold?”
Greim deflected by returning to stereotyping concerns but could not fully reconcile permitting race awareness for some purposes while prohibiting it for remedial ones.
The Court should not invalidate Section 2 but should hold that plaintiffs' illustrative districts cannot disregard a state's political objectives, and that Section 2 plaintiffs cannot claim a lack of equal openness where politics rather than race is the likely reason for the state's refusal to create a majority-minority district. This would properly tailor Section 2 to situations presenting a significant risk of intentional discrimination.
- The arguments pressed here were neither raised nor rejected in Milligan; Alabama never argued incumbency protection or partisan advantage as reasons for its map.
- The Robinson court erred in three ways: ignoring incumbency protection, combining geographically disparate Black populations in violation of LULAC, and failing to control for partisan versus racial polarization.
- Section 2 as construed under Gingles functions as a reverse partisan gerrymander on racial grounds — requiring districts for Black Democrats that would never be created for white Democrats in Republican states.
- A properly construed effects test should identify situations presenting a significant risk of intentional discrimination, like cases where a state departs from its own race-neutral principles to disadvantage a racial group within the same partisan coalition.
Key Exchanges with Justices
Justice Jackson
“Why is intentional discrimination the bedrock requirement when Congress enacted Section 2 as enforcement legislation specifically to go beyond intent?”
Mooppan acknowledged Congress can go beyond intent but argued the effects test must be tailored to situations presenting a 'significant risk' of intentional discrimination, not mere partisan outcomes.
Justice Sotomayor
“The bottom line is just get rid of Section 2 because the test you're providing doesn't do anything for the effects test Congress identified.”
Mooppan insisted Section 2 would still apply in areas with intra-party racial polarization, like Harlem or parts of Florida, but this narrow scope concerned multiple justices.
Justice Gorsuch
“How do we control for state political objectives? Can a state come in later with litigation positions about its goals? How much racial cohesion is enough?”
Mooppan acknowledged difficulties on the margins but compared it to the Court's existing racial gerrymandering framework and Brnovich's new test for vote denial.
Precedent Cases Cited
Allen v. Milligan
599 U.S. 1
Central to the case as a nearly identical Section 2 challenge decided just two years prior. Robinson appellants argued it controls this case and forecloses revisiting Gingles; opponents argued their specific arguments were not raised or rejected there.
Thornburg v. Gingles
478 U.S. 30
Established the three-precondition framework for Section 2 vote dilution claims that is at the heart of the constitutional challenge. All parties debated whether this framework should be revised, limited, or maintained.
Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (SFFA)
600 U.S. 181
Louisiana and appellees argued it prohibits race-based classifications including in redistricting. Robinson appellants argued it is distinguishable because it involved university admissions diversity rationale, not remedying specified discrimination under Congress's enforcement power.
Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I)
509 U.S. 630
Established the racial gerrymandering cause of action under which the Callais plaintiffs challenged SB8, requiring strict scrutiny when race predominates in districting decisions.
City of Boerne v. Flores
The congruence-and-proportionality test for Congress's enforcement power was debated as potentially applicable to Section 2. Robinson appellants noted the Court held up the VRA as paradigmatic; opponents argued Section 2 as construed fails this test.
Rucho v. Common Cause
588 U.S. 684
The government argued that after Rucho established partisan gerrymandering as non-justiciable, states can openly articulate partisan objectives as traditional race-neutral principles, creating a new defense to Section 2 claims not previously available.
Cooper v. Harris
581 U.S. 285
Cited for the racial predominance standard in gerrymandering cases and for the principle that compliance with Section 2 is a compelling interest only if Section 2 is properly applied — the Court has assumed but not decided this question.
Miller v. Johnson
Cited for establishing that race as the predominant motivating factor triggers strict scrutiny in redistricting, and that DOJ's incorrect interpretation of Section 5 did not provide a compelling interest.
Legal Terminology
Analysis & Opinions
The Supreme Court is expected to issue a major ruling under the Voting Rights Act that could significantly reshape congressional district maps across the country. The timing of the decision is critical, as it could impact redistricting efforts ahead of the upcoming midterm elections. The article examines how different outcomes and timing scenarios could affect the political landscape.