Noem v. Al Otro Lado
Whether asylum seekers who were allegedly turned away at the U.S.-Mexico border by Customs and Border Protection officers have a viable legal claim under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and whether class-action treatment of such claims is appropriate.
The Decision
Roberts
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Kagan
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Gorsuch
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Kavanaugh
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Barrett
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Decided June 25, 2026
Majority Opinion— Justice Alito
The Supreme Court held that a noncitizen standing in Mexico does not "arrive in the United States" under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) until that person physically crosses the border into U.S. territory. The case arose from a government "metering" policy adopted in 2016 that limited the number of asylum seekers processed each day at ports of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border by stationing officers at the border to prevent more people from entering than could be safely processed. Advocacy groups challenged the policy, arguing it unlawfully denied inspection and asylum processing to people who had reached the border. The Ninth Circuit ruled for the challengers, holding that a person "arrives in the United States" even while still standing on the Mexican side if they encounter a U.S. official at the border.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the ordinary meaning of "arrives in the United States" requires actually entering the country. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, relied on dictionary definitions and common-sense examples: just as a football player doesn't arrive in the end zone when tackled at the one-yard line, an asylum seeker doesn't arrive in the United States while still in Mexico. The Court found support in statutory context, noting that Congress used phrases like "enters or attempts to enter" elsewhere in immigration law but did not include "attempt" language in the provisions at issue. The Court also invoked the presumption against giving U.S. statutes effect outside U.S. territory. Although the challengers argued this reading makes the phrase "arrives in the United States" redundant alongside "physically present in the United States" in the asylum statute, the Court found partial redundancy acceptable and explainable by Congress's simultaneous creation of the expedited removal process in 1996.
The practical effect of the ruling is that the federal government has no legal obligation under these statutes to inspect or accept asylum applications from noncitizens who have not yet crossed the border onto U.S. soil. The decision reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment that had barred the metering policy and clears the way for future administrations to resume metering if border conditions warrant it.
Concurring Opinions
Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion in full but wrote separately to flag two additional concerns. First, he argued that the lower court's class-wide declaratory relief likely violated a federal statute, 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1), which strips lower courts of authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of certain immigration enforcement provisions. Thomas contended that the District Court effectively gave the plaintiffs the same relief as a prohibited class-wide injunction by labeling it a "declaratory judgment," and he urged the Court to address this apparent end-run around the statutory bar in a future case.
Second, Justice Thomas raised constitutional concerns, arguing that even if a statute authorized the lower court's order requiring the executive branch to bring certain noncitizens into the country, such an order would infringe on the President's inherent constitutional authority to exclude aliens. He maintained that the power to exclude and deport aliens is part of the executive power under Article II and that Congress lacks enumerated authority to force the President to admit noncitizens against his will.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson, dissented sharply, arguing that the majority's interpretation guts Congress's longstanding mandate that all noncitizens arriving at the border must be inspected and allowed to apply for asylum. She contended that the majority's fixation on the preposition "in" ignores statutory context, history, and common sense. Reading the statutes as a whole, she argued, "arrives in the United States" encompasses noncitizens who are in the process of arriving—such as those presenting themselves at a port of entry—regardless of whether their foot has physically crossed the border line. She pointed to neighboring statutory provisions that use "arrives at" and "arriving in" interchangeably, federal regulations that have consistently defined "arriving alien" to include those attempting to come into the country at a port of entry, and the parenthetical in both statutes referencing arrival "whether or not at a designated port of arrival."
Sotomayor also emphasized that the majority's reading renders the "arrives in the United States" clause entirely superfluous alongside the "physically present in the United States" clause, violating the strong canon against surplusage. She detailed the humanitarian consequences of the metering policy, noting that it was often enforced even when ports had ample capacity, that officials were instructed to falsely claim facilities were full, and that the policy drove desperate asylum seekers to attempt dangerous illegal crossings—resulting in drownings and deaths. She argued the majority's holding gives the executive branch unchecked power to nullify Congress's detailed, mandatory inspection and asylum procedures simply by stationing officers at the border to block entry, a result Congress never intended. She traced the legislative history from 1917 forward to show that Congress has always required inspection of noncitizens arriving at ports and that the 1996 amendments were not meant to strip protections from those at the threshold of the border.
Justice Jackson
Justice Jackson filed a separate dissent. While the full text of her dissent was trimmed from the provided opinion, she joined Justice Sotomayor's dissent and wrote separately to express additional concerns about the majority's interpretation of the immigration statutes. Her participation in the Sotomayor dissent indicates agreement that noncitizens arriving at ports of entry are covered by the statutory inspection and asylum provisions regardless of whether they have physically crossed the border, and that the majority's ruling undermines Congress's carefully constructed immigration framework.
Oral Argument Recording
Via Spotify ↗
Background & Facts
Al Otro Lado is a nonprofit organization that provides legal services to migrants and asylum seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border. The organization, along with individual asylum seekers, filed a lawsuit alleging that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at ports of entry along the southern border were systematically turning away people who attempted to present themselves to request asylum — a practice often called 'metering' or 'turnbacks.' Under U.S. and international law, individuals physically present at a port of entry have the right to request asylum, and the lawsuit alleged that CBP officers were unlawfully preventing them from doing so, sometimes using physical force, deception, or simply refusing to process their claims.
The plaintiffs sought class-action status, meaning they wanted the lawsuit to represent a large group of similarly situated asylum seekers who had been turned away. The federal district court certified a class and found that the plaintiffs had legal standing to sue. The government appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that a class action was improper. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals largely upheld the lower court's rulings, finding that the plaintiffs had adequately shown they were harmed by the alleged turnback policy and that class certification was appropriate.
The federal government, now under Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, petitioned the Supreme Court to review the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Court agreed to hear the case in November 2025, with oral argument scheduled for March 24, 2026. The central legal disputes involve whether these plaintiffs can sue under the relevant immigration statutes, whether the class was properly certified, and how broadly courts can review CBP enforcement decisions at the border.
Why This Case Matters
This case has major implications for the rights of asylum seekers at U.S. ports of entry and the extent to which federal courts can oversee how immigration officers treat individuals who present themselves at the border. If the Supreme Court sides with the government, it could effectively shield border enforcement practices from judicial review and make it far harder for asylum seekers who are turned away to obtain any legal remedy. It could also dismantle the class action and leave thousands of people with no practical way to vindicate their rights in court.
More broadly, the case will help define the boundary between executive branch discretion in immigration enforcement and the rights Congress granted to asylum seekers under the Immigration and Nationality Act. A ruling in favor of the respondents would affirm that courts can scrutinize alleged systematic violations of asylum law at the border, potentially setting important limits on 'metering' and turnback policies that have been used by multiple administrations. Legal advocates, human rights organizations, and members of Congress on both sides of the aisle have filed amicus briefs, underscoring the case's significance for U.S. immigration policy and the rule of law at the border.
The Arguments
The government argues that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring this lawsuit and that the class was improperly certified because the alleged injuries are too individualized and speculative. The government further contends that immigration officers' decisions about how to process individuals at ports of entry involve discretionary enforcement choices that are largely shielded from judicial review under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
- Plaintiffs lack Article III standing because any future harm from being turned away at the border is speculative and depends on their own future choices to attempt re-entry.
- The INA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions limit courts' ability to review day-to-day border enforcement decisions made by CBP officers.
- Class certification was improper because determining whether each class member was actually turned away and harmed requires highly individualized factual inquiries incompatible with class-wide treatment.
- Allowing this class action to proceed would improperly second-guess executive branch decisions about how to manage the flow of asylum seekers at ports of entry.
Respondents argue that CBP's systematic practice of physically and verbally turning away asylum seekers at ports of entry violates the clear statutory right under the Immigration and Nationality Act to request asylum upon arrival, and that those harmed by this policy have standing to seek relief in federal court. They contend the class was properly certified because the plaintiffs share a common legal question: whether the turnback policy itself is unlawful.
- The INA expressly grants individuals who arrive at a port of entry the right to apply for asylum, and CBP officers' practice of turning them away without processing their claims is a clear statutory violation.
- Plaintiffs have concrete, documented injuries — they were physically prevented from exercising their legal rights — which is more than sufficient for Article III standing.
- The jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the INA do not bar courts from reviewing a systematic policy that categorically denies statutory rights; they only limit review of individual discretionary decisions.
- Class certification is appropriate because all class members share the same core legal question — whether the government's turnback policy is unlawful — making collective adjudication efficient and fair.
Precedent Cases Cited
TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez
594 U.S. 413
Central to the government's standing argument, as this case set a high bar requiring plaintiffs to show concrete, particularized harm to satisfy Article III standing, not merely a statutory violation.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
504 U.S. 555
Foundational standing case cited by the government to argue that plaintiffs must show injury-in-fact that is concrete, particularized, and not speculative — particularly relevant when plaintiffs claim future harm from potential future border crossings.
Jennings v. Rodriguez
583 U.S. 281
Relevant to questions of statutory interpretation of the INA and the scope of federal court jurisdiction over immigration detention and enforcement decisions.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
564 U.S. 338
The government relies on this case to argue that the class was improperly certified because the plaintiffs do not share a sufficiently common question of law or fact to justify class-wide treatment.
INS v. St. Cyr
533 U.S. 289
Respondents cite this case for the principle that Congress must speak with unmistakable clarity to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over immigration matters, and that ambiguous provisions should be read to preserve judicial review.
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc.
509 U.S. 155
Relevant background on the scope of the government's authority to intercept or turn back asylum seekers and the limits of INA protections at the border and beyond.
Legal Terminology
Analysis & Opinions
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