Humphrey's Executor v. United States

In a unanimous decision authored by Justice George Sutherland, the Supreme Court ruled that President Roosevelt had no power to remove William E. Humphrey from the Federal Trade Commission except for the causes Congress had specified in the statute. Because Roosevelt had removed Humphrey purely over policy disagreements — not for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance — the removal was unlawful, and Humphrey's estate was entitled to his unpaid salary.

The heart of the Court's reasoning was a critical distinction between two kinds of government officers. On one hand, there are purely executive officers — like the postmaster at issue in the earlier Myers v. United States case — who carry out the President's policies and serve as direct instruments of the executive branch. On the other hand, there are officers of independent agencies like the FTC, which Congress created to perform 'quasi-legislative' functions (like making rules and regulations) and 'quasi-judicial' functions (like conducting hearings and adjudicating disputes). The Court held that the FTC was not an arm of the executive branch in the ordinary sense. Instead, it was an agency created by Congress to carry out legislative policy, acting as an agent of Congress itself, and it needed to operate free from executive domination.

Justice Sutherland wrote that the authority of Congress to create independent agencies and shield their members from at-will presidential removal was essential to maintaining the separation of powers. If the President could remove commissioners whenever he disagreed with their policy judgments, these agencies would lose the independence Congress intended them to have. The Court emphasized that the FTC was designed to be nonpartisan and expert, exercising judgment independent of any single branch of government.

The Court took care to narrow the sweeping language of the earlier Myers decision, which some had read to mean the President could remove any appointed officer for any reason. The Court clarified that Myers applied only to purely executive officers and did not reach officers of independent agencies performing quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions. This distinction became a cornerstone of American administrative law, establishing the constitutional foundation for independent regulatory commissions that operate at arm's length from presidential control.

The ruling was decided 9–0, with no dissenting or concurring opinions. The unanimity of the Court underscored the strength of the principle that Congress has the power to insulate certain government officers from the full reach of presidential removal authority when those officers perform functions beyond the purely executive.