United States Postal Service v. Konan
Whether the Federal Tort Claims Act's 'postal exception,' which preserves sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the 'loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of mail,' bars tort claims based on intentional or wrongful conduct by postal employees, or only claims based on negligent conduct.
The Decision
Roberts
·
Alito
·
Kagan
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Gorsuch
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Kavanaugh
·
Barrett
·
Jackson
·
Decided February 24, 2026
Majority Opinion— Justice Thomas
The Supreme Court held that the Federal Tort Claims Act's "postal exception" shields the federal government from lawsuits even when Postal Service employees intentionally fail to deliver mail. The case involved Lebene Konan, a Texas property owner who alleged that postal workers deliberately withheld mail to her rental properties over a period of two years, causing her to lose tenants and suffer other harms. She sued the United States under state tort law, but the government argued it was immune from suit under the FTCA provision that bars claims "arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter."
Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Thomas concluded that both "loss" and "miscarriage" of mail, as those words were ordinarily understood when the FTCA was enacted in 1946, can result from intentional conduct, not just negligence. The Court found that "miscarriage" broadly means any failure of mail to reach its destination — whether caused by accident, negligence, or deliberate action. Similarly, "loss" means a deprivation of mail, which can happen when someone intentionally withholds it. The Court rejected the argument that the word "negligent" before "transmission" should be read to limit the other two terms to negligent conduct only, explaining that an adjective modifying the last item in a list does not automatically apply to earlier items.
As a practical matter, the decision means that people who believe postal workers deliberately withheld, destroyed, or otherwise interfered with their mail generally cannot sue the federal government for money damages under the FTCA. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Konan's favor and sent the case back for further proceedings, without deciding whether every one of Konan's specific claims is barred or which legal arguments she properly preserved.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Sotomayor
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson, dissented, arguing that the postal exception was never meant to immunize the government when postal employees intentionally withhold or destroy mail. She emphasized that Congress deliberately chose specific, limited language for the postal exception rather than granting the Postal Service blanket immunity the way it did for some other agencies. She pointed out that Congress expressly added the word "negligent" before "transmission," which signals that it cared about the type of misconduct involved and did not intend to cover intentional wrongdoing. In her view, "loss" and "miscarriage" ordinarily suggest inadvertent or accidental failures — people say they "lost" their keys when they misplace them, not when someone steals them — and the majority stretched these words beyond their natural meaning.
Justice Sotomayor also argued that the majority's broad reading makes Congress's use of the word "negligent" pointless, since virtually any intentional misconduct involving mail would already be swept in under the majority's expansive definitions of "loss" and "miscarriage." She contended that other safeguards in the law — such as requirements that the employee's conduct be within the scope of employment and that claims meet plausibility standards — would prevent a flood of frivolous lawsuits if the Court had ruled otherwise. She warned that the majority's decision effectively gives the Postal Service the kind of blanket immunity Congress chose not to provide, undermining the FTCA's broad waiver of sovereign immunity.
Background & Facts
Lebene Konan alleges that postal employees, over a two-year period, intentionally withheld her mail and returned it to the sender as part of a campaign of racial harassment. She claims that while all her neighbors received their mail normally, her mail stopped being delivered, and when the Postal Service learned she owned another property, mail stopped being delivered there too. She filed multiple administrative complaints but the conduct continued.
Konan brought four tort claims against the United States: conversion (unlawful taking of property), intentional infliction of emotional distress, nuisance, and intentional interference with prospective economic relations. The government argues that all her claims fall within the postal exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act and are therefore barred by sovereign immunity. The Fifth Circuit ruled in Konan's favor, finding the postal exception did not cover her claims.
The United States Postal Service petitioned the Supreme Court, arguing that the terms 'loss' and 'miscarriage' in the postal exception are broad enough to cover intentional conduct, meaning the government retains immunity even when postal employees deliberately fail to deliver mail.
Why This Case Matters
This case could determine whether the federal government is immune from all tort liability when postal employees intentionally mishandle or withhold someone's mail, or only when negligence is involved. The Postal Service processes over 300 million pieces of mail daily and receives over 300,000 complaints about letter carriers annually, so the scope of this exception has enormous practical consequences for both the government's litigation exposure and individuals' ability to seek redress for deliberate postal misconduct.
The decision will also clarify how the Court interprets overlapping terms in statutory exceptions to sovereign immunity waivers, potentially affecting how other FTCA exceptions are read. If the Court rules for the government, it would effectively immunize the Postal Service from all tort claims related to mail delivery itself, leaving individuals with no judicial remedy even for egregious intentional conduct like racially motivated mail withholding or destroying someone's rent checks.
The Arguments
The postal exception covers any claim arising from mail not arriving or being damaged, regardless of whether the cause was intentional or negligent. The terms 'loss' and 'miscarriage' had broad historical meanings in 1946 that encompassed both intentional and unintentional deprivations, and Congress used a belt-and-suspenders approach with overlapping terms to fully protect postal operations from disruptive lawsuits.
- Pre-FTCA cases and dictionaries used 'miscarriage' to describe mail that failed to arrive for any reason, including intentional returns to sender, without distinguishing between intentional and negligent causes.
- The word 'loss' in the postal exception should carry the same meaning as in the FTCA's sovereign immunity waiver (Section 1346(b)(1)), where 'loss of property' clearly encompasses both intentional and negligent deprivations.
- Allowing claims based on alleged intentional conduct would open the floodgates to litigation, since intent is easy to allege and hard to disprove, potentially quadrupling the Postal Service's annual caseload.
- Congress made similar judgments in other FTCA exceptions, immunizing intentional torts like assault and battery, showing it was willing to bar even egregious intentional conduct claims to protect government operations.
Key Exchanges with Justices
Justice Kagan
“Aren't the three terms best read in parallel as things the post office does to your mail—losing it, miscarrying it, and negligently transmitting it—all suggesting non-intentional conduct by the words they keep company with?”
It revealed a strong intuition that the statutory context limits all three terms to non-intentional conduct, directly challenging the government's broadest reading.
Justice Jackson
“Why would Congress, in a statute authorizing tort liability, have intended to immunize a postal worker who tears up a person's rent check or Social Security check intentionally right in front of them?”
It showed skepticism that Congress would have wanted to strip all remedies for egregious intentional misconduct in the postal context.
Justice Gorsuch
“Under your reading, do these three terms cover the waterfront of anything having to do with mail delivery, making the government effectively totally immunized for both intentional and non-intentional actions?”
It highlighted the surplusage concern—if the government's reading is correct, Congress could have simply said 'any activities of USPS' rather than listing three overlapping terms.
The postal exception only bars claims arising from negligent mail handling, not intentional wrongful conduct. The government has produced zero examples of ordinary English speakers using 'miscarriage of mail' to describe wrongful conduct by a postal worker, and reading 'miscarriage' broadly renders both 'loss' and 'negligent transmission' entirely superfluous.
- No ordinary speaker of English would say a postal worker 'lost' someone's mail when the worker intentionally withheld it; 'loss' implies accidental deprivation, and 'miscarriage' historically referred to negligent failures.
- The FTCA conspicuously omits conversion and trespass to chattels from the intentional tort exception in 2680(h), showing Congress intended property-based intentional torts to remain actionable—the government's reading would uniquely exempt postal workers from conversion liability.
- Existing safeguards like Iqbal/Twombly pleading standards, scope-of-employment requirements, and the discretionary function exception already prevent frivolous claims, as demonstrated by the absence of a flood of litigation after Dolan.
- Three of Konan's four claims (IIED, nuisance, intentional interference) have as their gravamen the campaign of racial harassment, not the failure of mail to arrive, and thus fall outside the postal exception even under the government's reading.
Key Exchanges with Justices
Justice Barrett
“Can you address the presumption of consistent usage between 'loss' in the FTCA waiver and 'loss' in the postal exception, because in the waiver it clearly covers intentional conduct?”
It showed the Court taking seriously the government's textual argument that 'loss' must mean the same thing in both provisions, forcing respondent to explain why the presumption doesn't apply.
Justice Kavanaugh
“Assuming contrary to your position that 'miscarriage' does cover wrongful conduct, what are your remaining arguments?”
It revealed the respondent's alternative argument that even if miscarriage is broad, Dolan defined it as delivery to the wrong address—which doesn't describe Konan's situation—and Congress's omission of 'willful refusal to transmit' from the list is significant.
Justice Alito
“What are the consequences of your interpretation given how easy it would be for unhappy mail recipients to claim intentional rather than negligent conduct?”
It revealed concern about litigation floodgates, but the respondent effectively argued that Iqbal pleading standards and other FTCA guardrails would prevent frivolous claims, as Dolan predicted and experience confirmed.
Precedent Cases Cited
Dolan v. United States Postal Service
The central precedent interpreting the postal exception, which held the exception does not bar claims for injuries caused by how mail is placed (slip-and-fall from a package left on steps) and articulated a general rule about what injuries fall within the exception.
Kosak v. United States
Cited by respondent to show that Congress knew how to write a broad exception covering both intentional and unintentional conduct, as it did in the customs-handling exception, but chose narrower language for the postal exception.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
Both sides discussed the plausibility pleading standard as a safeguard against frivolous claims alleging intentional postal misconduct, with respondent arguing it would prevent the flood of litigation the government fears.
United States v. Neustadt
Cited by petitioner to show that Congress used overlapping terms ('deceit' and 'misrepresentation') in the FTCA's intentional tort exception, supporting a belt-and-suspenders reading of the postal exception.
Heinrich v. [New York Court of Appeals case by Judge Cardozo]
Cited by petitioner to show that pre-FTCA judicial authorities used 'loss' and 'miscarriage' interchangeably, including describing checks stuck behind a radiator at a post office as having 'miscarried.'
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Referenced alongside Iqbal as a pleading standard safeguard that would prevent frivolous claims of intentional postal misconduct from surviving a motion to dismiss.