Menna v. New York
Does a defendant's guilty plea automatically waive a constitutional claim of double jeopardy, or can the defendant still raise that claim on appeal despite having pleaded guilty?
The Decision
6-2 decision · Opinion by Per Curiam · 1975
Majority Opinion— Per Curiamconcurring ↓dissent ↓
The Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals in a per curiam opinion — an unsigned decision issued by the Court as a whole. The Court held that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant's claim under the Double Jeopardy Clause because such a claim challenges the constitutional power of the government to bring the defendant into court at all.
The Court's reasoning drew a sharp distinction between constitutional rights that protect a defendant during the trial process and constitutional rights that prevent the trial from ever taking place. Most constitutional rights — such as the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses, or the right against compelled self-incrimination — are protections that only become relevant if a case proceeds to trial. A guilty plea naturally waives these rights because the defendant is choosing to skip the trial altogether. But the Double Jeopardy Clause is categorically different. It does not merely guarantee a fair trial; it guarantees that certain trials will never happen.
The Court explained that when the government is constitutionally barred from prosecuting a defendant — as it is when a prior prosecution for the same offense has already occurred — the defendant's claim is that no matter how strong the evidence is, and regardless of factual guilt, the State simply has no right to pursue the case. A guilty plea is an admission that the defendant committed the acts charged, but it cannot logically constitute an admission that the government has the constitutional authority to prosecute those acts. The right not to be haled into court in the first place cannot be destroyed by what happens after the defendant has already been unconstitutionally forced into court.
The Court relied heavily on the principle it had articulated in Blackledge v. Perry (1974), which held that claims going to the very power of the State to bring a defendant into court survive a guilty plea. Applying that same principle to the double jeopardy context, the Court found that Menna was entitled to raise his claim on appeal despite having pleaded guilty. The decision was reached with a vote of approximately 6–2, as the Court was operating with only eight justices at the time due to a vacancy.
Concurring Opinions
The per curiam opinion included a notable footnote (footnote 2) clarifying that a counseled guilty plea does constitute an admission of factual guilt so reliable that it normally forecloses independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights during the proceedings. However, the Court stressed that this principle does not apply when the constitutional claim is that the government lacked the power to prosecute the defendant in the first instance.
Dissenting Opinions
Byron Whitejoined by William Rehnquist
Justice White dissented, arguing that a voluntary and counseled guilty plea should be treated as a waiver of constitutional claims, including double jeopardy. He contended that the majority's approach would undermine the finality of guilty pleas and create perverse incentives for defendants to plead guilty while preserving claims for appeal.
- A guilty plea has long been understood to represent a knowing and voluntary waiver of significant constitutional rights, and there is no principled reason to carve out double jeopardy as a special exception to this well-established rule.
- The proper remedy for a defendant who believes a prosecution is unconstitutional is to refuse to plead guilty and insist on his right to challenge the charges — not to plead guilty and then seek to vacate the conviction on appeal.
Background & Facts
Leonard Menna was charged in New York state court with offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree. Critically, Menna had already been subjected to a prior prosecution arising out of the same conduct. He argued that putting him on trial a second time for the same offense violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the government from prosecuting a person twice for the same crime.
Menna filed a motion to dismiss the second indictment on double jeopardy grounds, but the trial court denied it. Faced with the prospect of going through a full trial after losing his double jeopardy motion, Menna chose to plead guilty. He then sought to appeal the denial of his double jeopardy claim through the New York appellate courts.
Both the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals ruled against Menna. The state courts held that by entering a voluntary guilty plea, Menna had forfeited his right to challenge the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. In their view, a guilty plea represented an admission of the charges and a waiver of any prior constitutional defects in the proceedings.
Menna petitioned the United States Supreme Court, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause is fundamentally different from other constitutional protections because it does not merely guarantee fair procedures at trial — it bars the government from bringing the prosecution at all. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve whether such a foundational constitutional claim could truly be extinguished by the act of pleading guilty.
The Arguments
Menna argued that his guilty plea could not waive his double jeopardy claim because the Double Jeopardy Clause challenges the government's very authority to bring the prosecution in the first place. A right not to be tried at all cannot logically be surrendered by participating in the proceedings one should never have faced.
- The Double Jeopardy Clause is not merely a trial right or procedural safeguard — it is a fundamental bar on the government's power to prosecute someone twice for the same offense.
- If a guilty plea could erase a double jeopardy claim, the government could effectively circumvent the constitutional prohibition by pressuring defendants into plea bargains after bringing unconstitutional second prosecutions.
- The Supreme Court's prior reasoning in Blackledge v. Perry established that constitutional claims going to the state's power to prosecute at all are not waived by a guilty plea.
New York argued that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea represents a deliberate waiver of all non-jurisdictional constitutional claims, including double jeopardy. By choosing to plead guilty rather than proceed to trial, Menna accepted the charges and forfeited his right to challenge the prosecution.
- A guilty plea is a solemn admission of factual guilt and traditionally operates as a waiver of numerous constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses.
- Allowing defendants to plead guilty and then attack the prosecution on appeal would undermine the finality and efficiency of the plea bargaining process that the criminal justice system depends upon.
- The proper course for a defendant who believes the prosecution is unconstitutional is to refuse to plead guilty and litigate the issue at trial, not to plead guilty and seek to undo the conviction later.