Lehr v. Robertson
Does the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that a biological father who has never established a substantial relationship with his child receive notice of and an opportunity to be heard in the child's adoption proceeding?
The Decision
6-3 decision · Opinion by John Paul Stevens · 1983
Majority Opinion— John Paul Stevensconcurring ↓dissent ↓
The Supreme Court ruled 6–3 against Jonathan Lehr, holding that New York's statutory scheme did not violate either the Due Process Clause or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion was written by Justice John Paul Stevens.
The core of the Court's reasoning rested on a crucial distinction: a biological connection alone does not automatically create a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship. Justice Stevens explained that the Constitution protects the rights of parents who have developed a relationship with their children — who have, in the Court's words, grasped the opportunity to develop a relationship and accepted the responsibilities that go along with it. When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child, his interest in personal contact with the child acquires substantial constitutional protection. But when a biological father has done essentially nothing to establish a relationship, the Constitution does not require that he be given the same procedural protections as a parent who has.
The Court emphasized that New York's statutory scheme was carefully designed to protect the interests of fathers who showed any initiative. The state provided a simple mechanism — the putative father registry — that required nothing more than mailing a form to ensure that a biological father would receive notice of any adoption proceeding involving his child. Lehr had failed to avail himself of this or any other opportunity to establish his legal connection to Jessica over the more than two years of her life. The Court found this framework to be a reasonable and constitutionally adequate way of balancing the rights of biological fathers against the state's interest in the welfare of children and the finality of adoption proceedings.
On the Equal Protection challenge, the Court acknowledged that mothers and fathers were treated differently under the statute but held that this distinction was justified. Unlike a biological father, a mother always has an established relationship with the child by virtue of carrying and giving birth to the child. The different treatment therefore reflected a real difference in circumstances, not mere gender-based stereotyping. The Court carefully distinguished its earlier decision in Caban v. Mohammed, noting that in Caban the father had actually established a substantial relationship with his children, making the case fundamentally different from Lehr's situation.
Concurring Opinions
There were no separately written concurring opinions of particular note in this case.
Dissenting Opinions
Byron Whitejoined by Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun
Justice White argued that Lehr had a fundamental right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his parental relationship with Jessica was permanently severed. The dissent contended that the biological relationship itself was enough to trigger due process protections, and that New York could not extinguish a father's rights without at least informing him that an adoption proceeding was underway — especially when the state knew who and where he was.
- Lehr had filed a paternity petition before the adoption was finalized, demonstrating that he was not an indifferent or absent father but was actively trying to establish his legal relationship with his child; the state's failure to coordinate between the two courts or notify him of the adoption was fundamentally unfair.
- The putative father registry should not be treated as the only mechanism for protecting a biological father's rights — the state knew Lehr's identity and knew he had filed a paternity action, yet chose not to inform him of the parallel adoption proceeding, which amounted to a deprivation of due process.
- The majority's distinction between biological fathers who have and have not established a relationship is circular — Lehr was denied the very opportunity to develop a relationship because the state allowed his parental rights to be terminated without telling him, effectively punishing him for a failure the state helped cause.
- The Constitution requires, at minimum, that a known biological father receive notice when his child is about to be permanently placed with another family, and the cost of providing such notice is minimal compared to the gravity of the interest at stake.
Background & Facts
Jonathan Lehr was the biological father of a girl named Jessica, born in 1976 to Lorraine Robertson. Lehr and Robertson had lived together before Jessica's birth, but after the child was born, Lehr never established a legal or substantial personal relationship with her. He did not live with Jessica, did not provide financial support, and did not seek to have his name placed on her birth certificate. Although Lehr claimed he had visited Jessica and stayed in contact, the record showed at most sporadic and limited interaction.
About eight months after Jessica's birth, Lorraine married Richard Robertson. When Jessica was roughly two years old, Richard Robertson filed a petition in the Surrogate's Court of Westchester County, New York, to adopt her. Under New York law, certain categories of fathers were entitled to receive notice before an adoption could proceed — including men who had been adjudicated as the father, men who had been listed on the birth certificate, men who lived openly with the child and the mother, men who had been identified in a paternity proceeding, and men who had registered with the state's putative father registry. Jonathan Lehr fell into none of these categories. He had not registered with the putative father registry, which New York had established precisely to allow biological fathers to protect their interests by simply mailing in a postcard-sized form. Consequently, the adoption went forward and was granted without any notice to Lehr.
Around the same time the adoption petition was filed, Lehr filed his own petition in Ulster County Family Court seeking to establish his paternity of Jessica. However, the adoption in Surrogate's Court was finalized before Lehr's paternity case was heard, effectively ending his claim. Lehr then challenged the adoption, arguing that New York's failure to give him notice of the proceeding violated his constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
New York's appellate courts upheld the adoption, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the state's statutory scheme adequately protected the rights of biological fathers who took steps to establish a relationship with their children. Lehr then appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case to address the important constitutional questions about how far a state must go to protect the rights of an uninvolved biological father when a child is being adopted.
The Arguments
Lehr argued that as Jessica's biological father, he had a fundamental liberty interest in his relationship with his child that could not be terminated without due process of law. He contended that the state was required to give him notice of the adoption proceeding and an opportunity to be heard before his parental rights were extinguished.
- The biological connection between a father and his child creates a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, regardless of whether the father has established a social relationship with the child.
- The Supreme Court's prior decision in Stanley v. Illinois established that an unwed father has rights that the state cannot simply ignore, and the Court in Caban v. Mohammed struck down a New York law that allowed adoption without an unwed father's consent, demonstrating the constitutional importance of a father's rights.
- The Equal Protection Clause was violated because New York's law treated mothers and fathers differently — a mother always received notice of adoption proceedings, while a father received notice only if he fell into specific statutory categories, creating an unjustified gender-based distinction.
The respondent argued that New York's statutory framework was constitutional because it gave biological fathers ample opportunity to protect their rights by taking affirmative steps — such as registering with the putative father registry — and that a father who fails to establish any meaningful relationship with his child has no constitutional right to block the child's adoption.
- New York law provided multiple avenues by which a biological father could ensure he received notice of any adoption proceeding, including a simple putative father registry, and Lehr chose to use none of them.
- The mere biological fact of fatherhood, without any accompanying relationship or demonstrated commitment to parental responsibility, does not give rise to the same constitutional protections as an established parent-child relationship.
- The state has a strong interest in the welfare of children and in the stability and finality of adoption proceedings, which would be undermined if absent biological fathers could challenge adoptions long after they were finalized.