Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc. (Latiolais II)
Whether state-law failure-to-warn claims brought against a military contractor 'relate to' the contractor's federally directed act of installing asbestos on Navy ships for purposes of removal to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), as amended in 2011.
The Decision
13-2 decision · Opinion by Judge Edith Brown Clement · 2019
Majority Opinion— Judge Edith Brown Clementconcurring ↓dissent ↓
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the remand order and held that Latiolais's failure-to-warn claims were properly removable to federal court under the federal officer removal statute. The majority opinion was authored by Judge Edith Brown Clement and joined by a substantial majority of the court, with only a small number of judges dissenting.
The core of the majority's reasoning turned on the meaning of the 2011 amendment to § 1442(a)(1). Before 2011, the statute allowed removal of suits brought 'for' an act under color of federal office. Congress amended the statute in the Removal Clarification Act of 2011 to allow removal of suits 'for or relating to' such acts. The majority held that this was a deliberate and meaningful expansion. Drawing on Supreme Court precedent interpreting the phrase 'relating to' in other statutory contexts (notably the Employee Retirement Income Security Act), the court found that 'relating to' requires only a connection or association between the plaintiff's claims and the federally directed conduct—not a direct causal link.
Applying this standard, the majority found that failure-to-warn claims plainly 'relate to' the act of installing asbestos on Navy ships. The obligation to warn about a hazardous substance is directly connected to the act of using that substance. Because Huntington Ingalls installed asbestos under the direction and detailed specifications of the federal government, and because Latiolais's claims arose from that very asbestos exposure, the necessary connection was satisfied.
The court also confirmed that the other requirements for federal officer removal were met: Huntington Ingalls was 'acting under' a federal officer when it built and repaired Navy ships according to government specifications, and it raised a colorable federal defense in the form of the government contractor defense. The decision effectively opened the door for military contractors across the Fifth Circuit to remove asbestos failure-to-warn cases to federal court, and it became the leading precedent on how the 2011 'relating to' amendment broadened removal jurisdiction.
Concurring Opinions
This case is a Fifth Circuit en banc decision, not a U.S. Supreme Court case, though it is widely cited as the leading authority on the expanded scope of removal under the 2011 amendment to the federal officer removal statute. Its influence extends well beyond the Fifth Circuit, as courts across the country have relied on its reasoning when addressing similar removal questions in asbestos and military contractor litigation.
Dissenting Opinions
Judge James L. Dennis
The dissent argued that the majority read the 'relating to' amendment far too broadly, effectively converting the federal officer removal statute into a blanket mechanism for military contractors to escape state courts in any tort case even tangentially connected to government work. The dissent contended that the amendment was not intended to eliminate the requirement that the federal government actually directed or controlled the specific conduct being challenged.
- The federal government directed the installation of asbestos but never directed the contractor to withhold warnings, so the specific conduct at issue in the failure-to-warn claims was not performed under federal direction.
- The majority's expansive reading of 'relating to' would swallow virtually all state-law tort claims against military contractors, undermining the traditional role of state courts in adjudicating personal injury disputes.
- Congress intended the 2011 amendment to be a modest clarification, not a dramatic expansion that would federalize an entire category of state-law litigation.
Background & Facts
This case is actually a landmark decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, decided en banc (meaning by the full court rather than a typical three-judge panel), rather than a U.S. Supreme Court case. It nonetheless became one of the most important federal appellate rulings on the scope of the federal officer removal statute in the context of asbestos litigation against military contractors.
Larry Latiolais worked at the Avondale shipyard in Louisiana, a facility operated by Huntington Ingalls Industries (a successor company to Avondale Industries and Northrop Grumman Ship Systems). As part of his work, Latiolais was exposed to asbestos while working on the construction and repair of vessels for the United States Navy. He later developed serious illness attributed to that asbestos exposure and filed a lawsuit in Louisiana state court, alleging that Huntington Ingalls had failed to adequately warn him about the dangers of asbestos.
Huntington Ingalls sought to remove the case from state court to federal court by invoking the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). This statute allows private parties who performed work under the direction of a federal officer to move certain lawsuits into federal court, where they can raise federal defenses such as the government contractor defense. The company argued that it installed asbestos on Navy ships at the specific direction and under the detailed specifications of the United States government, and that the failure-to-warn claims were connected to that federally directed work.
The federal district court disagreed and sent the case back to state court, finding that Latiolais's claims were not sufficiently connected to federally directed conduct. A three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed that remand in what became known as Latiolais I. However, the full Fifth Circuit then agreed to rehear the case en banc, recognizing that the 2011 amendment to the federal officer removal statute—which added the words 'or relating to'—raised a significant question about whether the scope of removal had been broadened, particularly in the heavily litigated area of asbestos claims against military contractors.
The en banc rehearing drew substantial attention because the question had wide implications: thousands of asbestos cases were pending in state courts across the country against shipbuilders and other military contractors, and the answer would determine whether those companies could move their cases into the federal court system.
The Arguments
Latiolais argued that his failure-to-warn claims should remain in state court because the federal government never specifically directed Huntington Ingalls on what warnings to give or not give about asbestos. Since the government did not control the company's warning decisions, those claims were not sufficiently connected to any federally directed act to justify removal.
- The federal officer removal statute should require a direct connection between the federal government's direction and the specific conduct being challenged in the lawsuit—here, the failure to warn.
- The government directed the installation of asbestos but did not direct the company to withhold warnings, so the warning-related claims are independent of federal direction.
- A broad reading of 'relating to' would effectively allow military contractors to remove virtually any state-law tort case to federal court, undermining state sovereignty over personal injury claims.
Huntington Ingalls argued that its failure-to-warn claims clearly 'related to' its federally directed act of installing asbestos on Navy ships, and that the 2011 amendment to the federal officer removal statute was specifically intended to broaden the connection required for removal to federal court.
- The 2011 amendment to § 1442(a)(1) deliberately added the phrase 'or relating to,' which is a well-known term of legal art that Congress uses to signal a broad and expansive connection rather than a narrow causal link.
- The duty to warn about asbestos arises directly from the very same activity—installing asbestos—that the company performed under federal direction, so the claims are inherently related to federally directed conduct.
- The company has a colorable government contractor defense because the government controlled the specifications of the ships, and the company should be able to raise that defense in federal court.