EEOC v. Aramco
Does Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply extraterritorially to protect United States citizens employed by American companies in foreign countries?
The Decision
6-3 decision · Opinion by William H. Rehnquist · 1991
Majority Opinion— William H. Rehnquistconcurring ↓dissent ↓
In a 6–3 decision authored by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that Title VII does not apply extraterritorially to regulate the employment practices of American employers who employ American citizens abroad. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit, ruling that Boureslan's claims could not proceed.
The majority opinion rested heavily on the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes, a longstanding canon of interpretation rooted in the principle that 'legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.' Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that this presumption serves important purposes: it protects against unintended conflicts between U.S. law and the laws of other nations, and it ensures that the judiciary does not assume Congress meant to impose American legal standards on conduct occurring in foreign countries without a clear directive to do so.
The Court examined and rejected each of the textual arguments the EEOC put forward. Regarding the 'alien exemption' clause, the majority concluded that this provision could reasonably be read to apply to aliens working within the United States or in clearly domestic contexts, and therefore did not compel the inference that Congress intended the entire statute to apply abroad. As for the 'foreign commerce' reference in the definition of 'commerce,' the Court noted that this language was too ambiguous and boilerplate to constitute the kind of affirmative, unmistakable evidence of congressional intent needed to overcome the presumption.
The majority also rejected the argument that Title VII's broad remedial purpose was sufficient to extend its reach overseas. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that even though Title VII is an important civil rights statute, general statements of purpose cannot substitute for the specific textual evidence of extraterritorial intent that the presumption demands. The Court emphasized that it is Congress's responsibility — not the judiciary's — to decide whether American civil rights protections should follow American workers abroad, and that Congress had simply not spoken clearly enough on this point to overcome the strong default rule against extraterritoriality.
Concurring Opinions
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a concurrence in part and in the judgment, agreeing with the result but emphasizing that the Court should rely solely on the statutory text to determine whether the presumption against extraterritoriality had been overcome, and should not look to legislative history at all — even to confirm what the text already shows.
Dissenting Opinions
Thurgood Marshalljoined by Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul Stevens
Justice Marshall argued that the text, structure, and legislative history of Title VII all clearly supported its application to American citizens employed abroad by American companies. He contended that the majority applied the presumption against extraterritoriality in a rigid and unnecessarily demanding way that ignored strong evidence of congressional intent embedded within the statute itself.
- The 'alien exemption' provision — which states that Title VII does not apply 'with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State' — would be entirely superfluous unless Congress understood the statute to have some application outside the United States. The majority's alternative readings of this clause were strained and unconvincing.
- The legislative history of Title VII shows that Congress was aware of and concerned about discrimination by American companies operating abroad, and the statute should be read in light of its broad remedial purpose to eliminate employment discrimination wherever American employers and American citizens are involved.
- The majority set an unreasonably high bar for overcoming the presumption against extraterritoriality, effectively requiring Congress to include magic words that no reasonable legislator would think necessary given the statutory text already in place.
Background & Facts
Ali Boureslan was a naturalized United States citizen who was born in Lebanon. He was employed by Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), a corporation incorporated in Delaware, and its subsidiary Aramco Services Company, a Texas corporation. Boureslan worked for Aramco in Saudi Arabia. While working abroad, he claimed that he was subjected to harassment and was ultimately fired because of his race, religion, and national origin — all categories protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the landmark federal law that prohibits employment discrimination.
After filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Boureslan sued Aramco in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The EEOC intervened in the case as an additional plaintiff, arguing that Title VII should protect American workers employed overseas by American companies. Aramco moved to dismiss the case, arguing that Title VII simply did not apply to employment practices taking place on foreign soil.
The District Court agreed with Aramco and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Congress had not intended Title VII to reach employment relationships abroad. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed that dismissal. The Fifth Circuit relied on the longstanding legal principle known as the 'presumption against extraterritoriality,' which holds that federal statutes are generally assumed to apply only within the borders of the United States unless Congress clearly says otherwise.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case because the question of whether Title VII protects Americans working abroad for American companies was both unresolved and significant. Different courts had reached different conclusions on this issue, and the EEOC — the federal agency charged with enforcing Title VII — believed the lower courts had gotten the answer wrong. The case thus presented an important question about the geographic reach of one of America's most important civil rights laws.
The Arguments
The EEOC and Boureslan argued that Title VII was intended by Congress to apply to American employers who employ American citizens abroad, and that several provisions in the statute's text strongly implied extraterritorial reach. They contended that reading Title VII as limited to U.S. soil would leave American citizens working for American companies overseas with no federal protection against workplace discrimination.
- Title VII contains an 'alien exemption' clause providing that the law does not apply 'with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State.' The EEOC argued this provision would be meaningless unless Congress assumed the statute applied overseas in the first place — otherwise, there would be no need to exempt foreign workers abroad.
- The statute's definition of 'commerce' includes 'trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States; or between a State and any place outside thereof.' The EEOC argued the phrase 'any place outside thereof' encompassed foreign nations, showing Congress contemplated overseas application.
- Title VII is a broad remedial statute designed to eliminate discrimination in the American workplace, and it would be inconsistent with that broad purpose to allow American companies to freely discriminate against American citizens simply because they are stationed abroad.
Aramco argued that Title VII, like most federal statutes, was presumed to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the United States unless Congress had clearly indicated otherwise. Aramco maintained that Congress had provided no such clear indication, and that the textual clues cited by the EEOC were too ambiguous to overcome the strong presumption against extraterritorial application.
- Under the well-established presumption against extraterritoriality, courts should not interpret federal statutes to apply abroad unless Congress has made its intent to do so 'clearly expressed,' and Title VII contains no such clear expression.
- The 'alien exemption' clause can be explained by its application to aliens working inside the United States, or to workplaces in U.S. territories and possessions — it does not necessarily imply that the statute was meant to reach overseas employment of U.S. citizens.
- Applying Title VII extraterritorially would raise significant practical problems and potential conflicts with the laws and customs of foreign nations, which further counsels against reading the statute to apply abroad without a clear congressional directive.