Civil Rights Act of 1964
Does Congress have the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination by private businesses that serve the public, as enacted in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
The Decision
9-0 decision · Opinion by Tom C. Clark · 1964
Majority Opinion— Tom C. Clarkconcurring ↓
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously, 9–0, in favor of the United States, holding that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. Justice Tom C. Clark authored the majority opinion.
The Court began by examining the extensive record that Congress had compiled before passing the Act. Congressional hearings included testimony from government officials, business owners, civil rights leaders, and ordinary citizens documenting how racial discrimination in hotels, restaurants, and other public establishments created severe hardships for Black Americans traveling across state lines. The testimony showed that Black travelers often had to drive long distances out of their way, sleep in cars, or skip meals entirely because establishments refused to serve them. This pervasive discrimination, the Court found, had a direct and highly disruptive effect on interstate travel and commerce.
Justice Clark emphasized that the Commerce Clause grants Congress broad authority to regulate activities that affect interstate commerce, even when those activities are local in nature. The Court noted that the Heart of Atlanta Motel was plainly connected to interstate commerce: it solicited business nationally, the vast majority of its guests were interstate travelers, and it was strategically located near major interstate highways. The motel's refusal to serve Black guests was exactly the kind of obstruction to interstate travel and commerce that Congress had documented and sought to eliminate.
The Court also decisively rejected the motel's other constitutional arguments. It found no violation of the Fifth Amendment, reasoning that Congress had acted rationally and that the regulation was not an unreasonable burden on private property rights. The Thirteenth Amendment argument — that requiring a business to serve all customers amounted to slavery — was dismissed as without merit. The Court concluded that the means Congress chose were reasonable and appropriate to achieve the legitimate goal of removing obstructions to interstate commerce caused by racial discrimination.
This decision, along with the companion case Katzenbach v. McClung (which upheld Title II as applied to a local restaurant), firmly established the constitutional foundation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and validated Congress's use of its commerce power as a tool for advancing civil rights. The ruling effectively ended the legal debate over whether the federal government could prohibit racial discrimination by private businesses serving the public.
Concurring Opinions
Justice Arthur Goldberg wrote a concurrence, joined by no other justice, emphasizing that Title II could also be supported by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not just the Commerce Clause. Justice William O. Douglas also wrote separately to argue that the Court should have rested its holding on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection, warning that relying solely on the Commerce Clause reduced fundamental human rights to a question of economics. Justice Hugo Black concurred separately, agreeing with the Commerce Clause basis but stressing that the power of Congress to regulate commerce is essentially unlimited when activities substantially affect interstate commerce.
Background & Facts
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a sweeping federal statute signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on July 2, 1964. Among its most significant provisions, Title II prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in places of public accommodation — hotels, restaurants, theaters, and similar establishments. Almost immediately, the constitutionality of the Act was challenged. The landmark Supreme Court case that validated this statute was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, decided on December 14, 1964, just months after the law took effect.
The Heart of Atlanta Motel was a large, 216-room commercial establishment located in downtown Atlanta, Georgia, near two interstate highways and two state highways. The motel actively solicited guests from across the country through national advertising, including in magazines and on billboards along interstate roads. Approximately 75 percent of its registered guests came from out of state. Despite this nationwide customer base, the motel had a longstanding practice of refusing to rent rooms to Black Americans. After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, the motel's owner filed a lawsuit seeking a court declaration that Title II was unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the federal government from enforcing it.
The motel's owner, Moreton Rolleston Jr., argued that Congress had overstepped its constitutional authority. He contended that the Commerce Clause of the Constitution — which gives Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce — did not extend to telling a private business owner whom he must serve. The United States government defended the law, arguing that racial discrimination in places of public accommodation placed a substantial burden on interstate commerce and that Congress had overwhelming evidence to support this conclusion.
A special three-judge panel in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia ruled against the motel, upholding the constitutionality of Title II and issuing a permanent injunction requiring the motel to stop discriminating. The motel appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case on an expedited basis given the enormous national importance of the question — whether the most significant piece of civil rights legislation in nearly a century could withstand constitutional scrutiny.
The Arguments
The motel argued that Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and violated the motel owner's constitutional rights. It maintained that Congress could not use its commerce power to force private businesses to serve customers they wished to refuse.
- Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce does not extend to controlling the operations of a private, locally situated business choosing whom to serve
- Title II deprived the motel owner of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment
- Compelling a private business owner to serve unwanted guests amounted to involuntary servitude prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment
The government argued that Congress had ample authority under the Commerce Clause to enact Title II because racial discrimination in public accommodations had a direct, substantial, and well-documented harmful effect on the flow of interstate commerce.
- Extensive congressional hearings produced overwhelming evidence that Black Americans were deterred from interstate travel because they could not find lodging, which directly burdened interstate commerce
- The motel itself served a predominantly interstate clientele, with 75% of guests traveling from out of state, making its discriminatory practices a clear burden on commerce among the states
- The Supreme Court had long recognized that Congress could regulate local activities that, taken in the aggregate, substantially affected interstate commerce