Cipollone v. Liggett, Inc.
Whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempted state common-law tort claims against cigarette manufacturers for damages related to smoking and health.
The Decision
7-2 on core framework; plurality (4-justice lead opinion) on specific claims under the 1969 Act decision · Opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens · 1992
Majority Opinion— Justice John Paul Stevensconcurring ↓dissent ↓
The Supreme Court issued a complex, fragmented opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens. On the central question of whether federal law completely shielded tobacco companies from state lawsuits, the answer was a firm no — but the Court drew important distinctions between different types of claims and between the two federal statutes.
First, on the 1965 Act, the Court held 7–2 that its preemption clause did not bar any state common-law damages claims. The 1965 Act only prohibited states from mandating additional 'statements' in cigarette advertising; it did not reach private lawsuits. The Court emphasized the longstanding legal presumption against interpreting federal statutes to preempt traditional state remedies unless Congress clearly says so. Nothing in the 1965 Act's text or history suggested Congress intended to eliminate the ability of injured smokers to sue.
Second, the 1969 Act posed a harder question because Congress had broadened the preemption language to prohibit any 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health' imposed 'under State law.' A four-justice plurality (Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and O'Connor) concluded that this broader language did reach some common-law claims — specifically, it preempted failure-to-warn claims and certain fraudulent-misrepresentation claims to the extent they were premised on a duty to include additional warnings in cigarette advertising. However, important categories of claims survived: breach of express warranty claims (where a company's own advertising made specific safety promises it did not keep), claims of intentional fraud and concealment of known health dangers through channels other than advertising, and conspiracy claims alleging that the tobacco industry actively suppressed and hid scientific information about smoking risks.
The practical result was that the case was sent back to the lower courts for further proceedings, because the Cipollone estate still had viable legal theories even after preemption was accounted for. The ruling established the foundational principle that federal product regulation does not automatically immunize an industry from all state-law accountability, and that courts should look carefully at what Congress actually said — and did not say — in a preemption clause before shutting the courthouse door on injured plaintiffs.
Concurring Opinions
The opinion in this case was unusually fragmented: Justice Stevens's opinion commanded a full majority (7–2) on the general preemption framework and the 1965 Act analysis, but only a four-justice plurality on the critical question of which specific claims the 1969 Act preempted. Justice Blackmun's group of three would have allowed all tort claims to proceed, while Justice Scalia's group of two would have preempted them all — meaning the plurality's middle-ground position controlled the outcome despite lacking majority support on those specific points.
Dissenting Opinions
Justice Antonin Scaliajoined by Justice Clarence Thomas
Justice Scalia argued that the 1969 Act's preemption clause was broad and unambiguous, and that it should be read to preempt all state common-law damages claims related to smoking and health — not just some of them. He believed the plurality's attempt to distinguish among different types of tort claims was an artificial and unworkable exercise that ignored the plain meaning of the statute.
- Common-law tort judgments do impose 'requirements' on defendants because they compel companies to change their behavior or face financial liability, which is functionally no different from a regulation
- The plurality's claim-by-claim parsing of which state-law theories survived and which did not created confusion and lacked a principled basis in the statutory text
- Congress chose sweeping preemptive language in 1969 precisely to prevent a patchwork of state-law obligations from undermining the federal labeling scheme
Justice Harry Blackmunjoined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice David Souter
Justice Blackmun argued that the 1969 Act should not be read to preempt any common-law damages claims at all. He maintained that the term 'requirement or prohibition' in the preemption clause referred only to positive enactments by state legislatures and regulatory agencies — not to the incidental regulatory effects of private tort lawsuits decided by juries.
- The strong presumption against preemption of state remedies should control, especially in a field like public health where states have traditionally exercised broad police powers
- There is a meaningful legal distinction between a state legislature passing a law that mandates specific warnings and a jury awarding damages to an injured individual — only the former is a 'requirement' in any natural sense of the word
- Congress showed no clear intent to eliminate the traditional right of injured individuals to seek compensation through the courts, and ambiguity should be resolved in favor of preserving those rights
Background & Facts
Rose Cipollone began smoking in 1942 at the age of 17 and continued for over four decades, smoking brands produced by three major tobacco companies: the Liggett Group, Lorillard, and Philip Morris. In 1981, she was diagnosed with lung cancer. In 1983, Rose and her husband Antonio filed a lawsuit in federal court in New Jersey against all three companies, alleging that they had failed to warn consumers about the known dangers of smoking, had breached express warranties by advertising cigarettes as safe, had engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation by concealing what they knew about smoking's health risks, and had conspired to hide medical and scientific information from the public.
Rose Cipollone died in 1984, and her husband continued the lawsuit. After Antonio himself died in 1990, their son Thomas carried on the case as executor of Rose's estate. The litigation raised not only factual questions about whether the tobacco companies had acted wrongfully, but also a critical legal question: had Congress, by passing federal cigarette labeling laws, effectively blocked individuals from suing tobacco companies under state law?
The federal statutes in question were the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 and its successor, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969. The 1965 Act required health warning labels on cigarette packages and included a provision stating that no additional 'statement relating to smoking and health' could be required in cigarette advertising. The 1969 Act went further, declaring that 'no requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law' regarding the advertising or promotion of labeled cigarettes. The tobacco companies argued these laws shielded them from state-law lawsuits.
The U.S. District Court allowed some claims to proceed but found others preempted. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal labeling acts preempted a broad range of state tort claims, including failure-to-warn and fraudulent-misrepresentation claims. The Cipollone family appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case to resolve a significant split among lower courts over how far the preemption provisions of these federal cigarette laws actually reached.
The Arguments
The Cipollone family argued that federal cigarette labeling laws were designed only to prevent states from imposing different labeling requirements, not to strip individuals of their right to sue tobacco companies for injuries. They contended that common-law tort claims — like suits for damages — are fundamentally different from state regulations and were never intended to be preempted by Congress.
- The text of the 1965 Act's preemption clause was narrow, addressing only required 'statements' in advertising — not private lawsuits for damages
- There is a strong legal presumption against reading federal statutes to displace traditional state-law remedies unless Congress makes its intent unmistakably clear
- Congress's purpose was to establish uniform labeling requirements, not to provide a blanket immunity from liability for the entire tobacco industry
The tobacco companies argued that both the 1965 and 1969 federal cigarette labeling statutes preempted state common-law damages claims related to smoking and health. They contended that allowing such state-law suits would effectively impose the very 'requirements' and 'prohibitions' that Congress had forbidden states from imposing.
- The 1969 Act's preemption clause was deliberately broadened to cover any 'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health' imposed 'under State law,' which includes obligations created by common-law tort judgments
- Allowing juries in every state to impose damages based on the adequacy of cigarette warnings would undermine the uniform national labeling standard Congress intended to create
- Federal regulation of cigarette warnings occupied the field and left no room for state-based legal theories about what tobacco companies should or should not have said about smoking risks