Carcieri v. Salazar
Does the phrase 'now under Federal jurisdiction' in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 limit the Secretary of the Interior's authority to take land into trust only for Indian tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the time the Act was enacted in 1934?
The Decision
6-3 decision · Opinion by Clarence Thomas · 2009
Majority Opinion— Clarence Thomasconcurring ↓dissent ↓
In a 6–3 decision authored by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit and ruled in favor of Rhode Island. The Court held that the phrase 'now under Federal jurisdiction' in Section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act unambiguously refers to those tribes that were under federal jurisdiction in 1934, when the statute was enacted. Because the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction at that time, the Secretary lacked statutory authority to take the 31-acre parcel into trust on the tribe's behalf.
Justice Thomas's opinion focused heavily on the ordinary meaning of the word 'now.' He reasoned that when Congress uses the word 'now' in a statute, it means at the time of the statute's enactment, not at some unspecified future point. The majority examined the text, structure, and legislative history of the IRA to confirm this reading. Thomas pointed to other provisions of the IRA that used 'now' in ways clearly tied to conditions in 1934, reinforcing that Congress meant the word to anchor the statute to the moment it became law.
The Court rejected the Secretary's argument that the IRA's remedial purpose warranted a broader interpretation. The majority emphasized that however sympathetic the policy goals might be, the Court's role is to interpret the statute as written, not to expand it beyond its plain meaning. Importantly, the Court also addressed arguments that subsequent federal legislation recognizing the Narragansetts or settling their land claims had effectively expanded the IRA's reach. The majority reaffirmed the strong presumption against implied repeals of statutes, holding that courts must attempt to harmonize two statutes and give effect to both before concluding that one has implicitly repealed or modified another. The Court found no evidence that Congress intended any later legislation to override the IRA's temporal limitation.
The practical effect of the ruling was significant: it meant that the Secretary of the Interior could only use the IRA's trust-land authority for tribes that could demonstrate they were under federal jurisdiction in 1934. Tribes recognized after that date — and there are many — would need to establish a 1934 connection to federal jurisdiction or seek separate congressional authorization to have land taken into trust. The decision had major implications for tribal sovereignty, land rights, and the balance of power between tribal, state, and federal governments.
Concurring Opinions
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote a concurrence agreeing that 'now' means 1934 but emphasizing an important distinction: a tribe need not have been formally 'recognized' in 1934 to qualify — it need only have been 'under Federal jurisdiction' at that time, which is a different and potentially broader inquiry. Breyer suggested that some tribes recognized after 1934 might still qualify if they could demonstrate that they had a sufficient relationship with the federal government in 1934, even without formal acknowledgment. Justice Souter also joined parts of the majority opinion while dissenting from the judgment.
Dissenting Opinions
John Paul Stevens
Justice Stevens argued that the majority's rigid interpretation of 'now' was incorrect and that the word should be read more flexibly to serve the IRA's broad remedial purpose of restoring lands to Indian tribes. He contended that Congress intended the IRA to benefit all recognized Indian tribes, not just those with a connection to federal jurisdiction frozen at a single moment in 1934.
- The IRA was enacted as a sweeping reform to reverse the devastating effects of the allotment era, and interpreting it narrowly defeats its core purpose of helping Indian tribes rebuild their land bases.
- The word 'now' can reasonably be read to mean 'currently' — at the time the Secretary acts — and the majority's insistence on a 1934 meaning is unnecessarily rigid and produces arbitrary results.
- The Secretary's longstanding practice of taking land into trust for tribes recognized after 1934 reflects a reasonable and permissible interpretation that the Court should have respected.
David Souterjoined by Ruth Bader Ginsburg
Justice Souter argued that the phrase 'now under Federal jurisdiction' was ambiguous enough to warrant deference to the Secretary's interpretation. He contended the majority wrongly treated the statutory language as unambiguous when reasonable alternative readings existed, and that the Secretary's broader interpretation was consistent with the statute's text and purpose.
- The phrase 'under Federal jurisdiction' is itself ambiguous and could encompass a broader range of relationships between tribes and the federal government than formal recognition, making the majority's sharp temporal cutoff unjustified.
- When a statute is ambiguous, courts should defer to the reasonable interpretation of the agency Congress charged with administering it, and the Secretary's reading of the IRA was at least reasonable.
- The majority's ruling creates an arbitrary distinction between tribes based solely on the timing of their federal recognition, with no connection to the substantive goals Congress sought to achieve.
Background & Facts
The Narragansett Indian Tribe is a Native American tribe located in Rhode Island with a history stretching back centuries. Although the Narragansetts had long occupied land in Rhode Island, they were not formally recognized by the federal government until 1983, when the Bureau of Indian Affairs granted them federal acknowledgment through its administrative process. In 1988, the tribe purchased a 31-acre parcel of land in the town of Charlestown, Rhode Island, and in 1991, the tribe asked the Secretary of the Interior to take that land into trust on its behalf under Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934. Under the IRA, the Secretary has authority to acquire land and hold it in trust 'for the purpose of providing land for Indians.' The IRA defines 'Indian' to include, among others, 'all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.'
The State of Rhode Island, led by Governor Donald Carcieri, strongly opposed the federal government's plan to take the land into trust. Rhode Island argued that placing the land in trust would effectively remove it from state and local jurisdiction — including taxation, zoning, and regulatory authority — which would harm the state's sovereignty and its residents' interests. The state contended that because the Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934, when the IRA was enacted, the Secretary had no authority under the Act to take land into trust for the tribe.
The Secretary of the Interior ultimately decided to accept the land into trust for the Narragansetts. Rhode Island sued in federal court. The U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island sided with the state, ruling that the Secretary lacked authority because the tribe was not under federal jurisdiction in 1934. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the word 'now' in the IRA did not necessarily freeze the statute's reach to 1934, and that the Secretary's broader interpretation of the law deserved judicial deference.
The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case to resolve a significant question of statutory interpretation with sweeping implications for federal Indian law: whether the Secretary could take land into trust for any federally recognized tribe, or only for tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the specific moment the IRA became law in 1934. The answer would affect dozens of tribes recognized after 1934 and potentially billions of dollars in land and governance decisions across the country.
The Arguments
The State of Rhode Island argued that the plain text of the Indian Reorganization Act limits the Secretary's trust-land authority to tribes that were 'under Federal jurisdiction' in 1934, when the law was passed. Because the Narragansett Tribe was not federally recognized until 1983, the Secretary had no statutory authority to take land into trust for it.
- The word 'now' in the phrase 'now under Federal jurisdiction' unambiguously refers to the time the IRA was enacted — 1934 — and cannot be stretched to mean some indefinite future date.
- Placing land into federal trust removes it from state taxation, zoning, and regulatory authority, significantly impacting state sovereignty, so the Secretary's power should not be expanded beyond what Congress clearly authorized.
- Later federal recognition of a tribe does not retroactively amend the IRA, and courts should not find that subsequent legislation implicitly repealed or modified the IRA's clear temporal limitation.
The Secretary of the Interior argued that the IRA grants broad authority to take land into trust for any federally recognized Indian tribe, and that the phrase 'now under Federal jurisdiction' should be read to include tribes that come under federal jurisdiction at any point, not just in 1934. Limiting the statute to 1934 would frustrate the IRA's remedial purpose of restoring tribal land bases.
- The IRA was designed as a sweeping remedial statute to reverse decades of harmful federal policies that had stripped tribes of their lands, and it should be interpreted broadly to serve that purpose.
- The word 'now' can reasonably be read to mean 'currently' — that is, at the time the Secretary exercises authority — rather than being frozen to a single historical moment.
- The Secretary's longstanding interpretation of the IRA as covering all currently recognized tribes deserves judicial deference under principles of administrative law, particularly given the agency's expertise in Indian affairs.